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The history of the enforcement of money judgments in Virginia
has been characterized by recurrent changes and revisions as the
legislature and the courts have attempted to reconcile the needs of
the business community with the rights of the debtors.1 Change
has not been synonymous with progress, however, and the old ad-
age that the more things change the more they remain the same is
nowhere more apt than in the context of collection practices in the
Old Dominion. Although the persistent creditor may have, in the
words of one observer, "a vast arsenal of remedies"2 at his disposal,
it seems to be a debtor's world to those practitioners who have
sought to employ the procedures that currently exist.' This is par-
ticularly true when the client is an unsecured creditor seeking to
enforce a money judgment against the debtor's personal property.
In today's modern economy, the ready availability of credit and
the relative ease with which a consensual lien may be secured on
chattels makes finding any personal property that is not already
encumbered increasingly more difficult for the creditor.4 Conse-
1. Historical development of Virgina law dealing with enforcement of judgments has
been treated in Riesenfeld, Collection of Money Judgments in American Law - A Historical
Inventory and a Prospectus, 42 IowA L. REV. 155, 169-70, 173-74 (1957) and Riesenfeld,
Enforcement of Money Judgments in Early American History, 71 MicH. L. REv. 691, 709-
12, 718 (1973). See also Charron & Co. v. Boswell, 59 Va. (18 Gratt.) 216 (1868).
2. Riesenfeld, Collections of Money Judgments, supra note 1, at 181.
3. As one commentator noted, creditors have more money but debtors have more votes.
Dugan, Creditors' Postjudgment Remedies: Part 1, 25 ALA. L. REV. 175, 199 n.148 (1972).
4. Id. at 198. When the creditor's claim is based on a judgment resulting from an automo-
bile accident that exceeds $50, an alternative collection tool is provided by statute. The
Virginia Code allows the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles to suspend the driver's license of
any person who does not pay a judgment within 30 days. VA. CODE § 46.1-442(a) (Repl. Vol.
1974).
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quently, creditors resort to the writ of execution, the primary tool
for enforcing money judgments against personalty, less and less
frequently 5
This Note will examine the postjudgment procedures available
to a creditor who seeks to enforce a money judgment against per-
sonal property owned by the debtor.' In addition to analyzing the
law of execution as it currently exists in Virginia, this survey will
address the effect of the new bankruptcy law.7 Finally, the consti-
tutional questions that have been raised in other states concerning
postjudgment procedures will be discussed in the context of Vir-
ginia's system.8
EXECUTION
A final money judgment9 rendered by either a general district
court 0 or a circuit court" has the effect of changing the relation-
ship of the opposing parties from plaintiff and defendant to credi-
tor and debtor. To the chagrin of the victor, this frequently means
not the end of the road, but merely the first step of a long and
often fruitless journey. The Virginia Code provides that money
judgments are to be enforced against the personalty of the debtor
by execution.12 When the debtor's property consists of real estate,
execution is unavailable and the creditor must enforce the judg-
5. A study of postjudgment remedies in Alabama revealed that property was recovered
under a writ of execution in less than one percent of the cases. Dugan, supra note 3, at 197.
6. Similar analyses of the postjudgment procedures in other states reflect the great diver-
sity of existing procedures and point up the need for a state-by-state approach. See, e.g.,
Baugh, Enforcement of Judgments in Tennessee, 22 TENN. L. REv. 873 (1953); Dugan,
supra note 3 (Alabama); Heiserman, Procedures Available for Implementation of a Judg-
ment in Iowa, 42 IOWA L. REv. 265 (1957); Meacham, Enforcement of Judgments Against
Personal Property, 1951 U. ILL. L.F 38; Developments in Georgia Law: Debtor-Creditor
Rights, 12 GA. L. REv. 814 (1978); Note, Postjudgment Procedures for Collection of Small
Debts: The Maine Solution, 25 ME. L. REv. 43 (1973); Note, Enforcing Money Judgments
in Tennessee, 4 MEM. ST. L. REv. 65 (1973); Symposium, Creditors' Post-Judgment Reme-
dies in Texas, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 715 (1974).
7. See notes 330-59 infra & accompanying text.
8. See notes 405-23 infra & accompanying text.
9. See Carney v. Poindexter, 170 Va. 233, 236, 196 S.E. 639, 640 (1938).
10. VA. CODE § 16.1-98 (Supp. 1978).
11. Id. § 8.01-466 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
12. Id. §§ 8.01-466 to 525.
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ment lien by a separate creditor's bill in equity.13 If the debtor
owns both personalty and real estate, the creditor may choose
against which to proceed first; no rule requires that one type of
property be exhausted before pursuing the other. 14
Execution presupposes that a valid judgment has been ren-
dered."5 If the judgment is void for any reason, then a resultant
execution likewise is void."6 Execution is carried out by means of a
writ of fiert facias which commands the sheriff to levy and satisfy
the amount of the judgment by selling the goods and chattels of
the debtor. 17 The fiert facias, or fi.fa., is an early common law writ
derived from England as one of several writs available to a judg-
ment creditor. The other common law writs of elegit,18 capias ad
satsfaciendum, 9 distringas,20 levari factas,21 and scire facas 22
13. Every money judgment rendered in the state becomes a lien on the real estate of the
debtor from the time the judgment is docketed. Id. § 8.01-458. Jurisdiction to enforce the
lien that is created is by a bill in equity. Id. § 8.01-462. Only if the rents and profits of the
real estate will not satisfy the judgment within five years can the realty be sold. Id.
14. Rush v. Dickenson County Bank, 128 Va. 114, 121, 104 S.E. 700, 703 (1920); Stovall v.
Border Grange Bank, 78 Va. 188, 196 (1883); A. PHELPS, HANDBOOK OF VIRGINIA RuLEs OF
PROCEDURE iN AcTIONS AT LAW 255 (3d ed. 1974). The doctrine of marshalling applies to any
tangible property owned by the debtor when one creditor has a lien on several items of
property and another creditor has a junior lien which likewise attaches to some of the same
property. Under this doctrine, the senior creditor is required to satisfy his lien to the extent
possible out of the property not subject to the lien of the junior creditor so as not to
prejudice the latter's ability to satisfy his judgment. The adoption of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, however, which rejects common law lien and title theories in regard to personalty
and the requirement that both creditors acquire a lien on the property before the doctrine
can be invoked, has rendered the doctrine obsolete as a practical matter insofar as person-
alty is concerned. This is particularly true now that a lien on tangible personalty depends on
a valid levy because of the unlikelihood of there being more than one lien on any particular
asset.
15. Shackleford v. Apperson, 47 Va. (6 Gratt.) 451 (1849). When the debtor is deceased,
all personalty first must be exhausted before the creditor can resort to the decedent's real
estate. VA. CODE § 64.1-155 (Repl. Vol. 1973) has been interpreted to mean that personalty
must be sold first. New v. Bass, 92 Va. 383, 23 S.E. 747 (1895); see also Scott v. Ashlin, 86
Va. 581, 10 S.E. 751 (1890).
16. Hill School v. Buchanan, 174 Va. 281, 283, 6 S.E.2d 622, 623 (1940).
17. VA. CODE § 8.01-474 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
18. Writ of elegit was created by the Statute of Westnmister II in England in 1285. The
writ, as adopted in Virginia in 1732, permitted the creditor to satisfy the judgment out of
the rents and profits of the debtor's lands, but the land itself could not be sold. United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Carter, 161 Va. 381, 170 S.E. 764 (1933); Riesenfeld, Enforce-
ment of Money Judgments, supra note 1, at 694, 710.
19. Writ of captas ad satisfactendum, adopted in Virginia in 1726, directed the sheriff to
arrest the debtor and imprison him until he satisfied the judgment or until the creditor
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since have been abolished by statute.23 The fi.fa., however, has
proved remarkably durable. The abolition of imprisonment for
debt resulted in the enlargement of the scope of the fiert facias
lien to encompass all the personal estate of the debtor whether lev-
iable or not,24 and has remained relatively unchanged to the pre-
sent time.
Issuance of the Writ
The judgment creditor, his assignee, or his attorney may request
that a writ of fiert facias be issued.25 If the source of the writ is a
permitted his release. Virginia abolished body execution and substituted interrogatory pro-
ceedings following judgment, which allows for the imprisonment of an uncooperative debtor
for contempt. See generally Evans v. Greenhow, 56 Va. (15 Gratt.) 153 (1859); Note, Body
Attachment and Body Execution: Forgotten But Not Gone, 17 WM. & MARY L. Rav. 543,
551 n.52 (1976).
20. Writ of distringas was a command to the sheriff to take possession of property of the
debtor in order to compel his appearance before the court. Cloud v. Catlett, 31 Va. (4 Leigh)
462 (1833); Jordan v. Williams, 24 Va. (3 Rand.) 501 (1825); Garland v. Bugg, 19 Va. (5
Munf.) 166 (1816).
21. Writ of levari factas at common law authorized the taking of personalty of the debtor
as well as the rents and profits from his real estate. In the United States, the writ became a
method that allowed the creditor to have the debtor's real estate sold to satisfy the judg-
ment. The writ was shortlived in Virginia, the fiert factas and elegit being preferred meth-
ods of execution. See A. FREEMAN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF ExECUTIONS IN CiviL CASES 6 n.1
(1885) [hereinafter cited as FREEMAN ON ExECUTIONS]; Riesenfeld, Collection of Money
Judgments, supra note 1, at 157-58.
22. Writ of scire facias was a judicial writ employed to revive a judgment, in which case
the writ represented a continuation of the original judgment. Duffy v. Hartsock, 187 Va.
406, 46 S.E.2d 570 (1948); American Ry. Express v. F.S. Royster Guano Co., 141 Va. 602,
126 S.E. 678 (1925); White's Adm'r v. Palmer, 110 Va. 490, 66 S.E. 44 (1909).
23. Scire factas was abolished under VA. CODE § 8.01-24 (Repl. Vol. 1977). The Virginia
Code section dealing with the writ of scire factas in the general district court has yet to be
repealed though the writ itself has been abolished. VA. CODE § 16.1-104 (Repl. Vol. 1975).
All the other aforementioned writs are abolished under VA. CODE § 8.01-467 (Repl. Vol.
1977).
24. Charron & Co. v. Boswell, 59 Va. (18 Gratt.) 216, 230 (1868); Puryear v. Taylor, 53 Va.
(12 Gratt.) 401, 407 (1855). The ca.sa., supra note 19, was abolished by the Code of 1849.
Prior to that time, the writ of fi.fa. was limited to the goods and chattels of the debtor. The
expansion of the fi.fa. coverage to include the debtor's entire estate was an effort by the
legislature to offset the loss of leverage over the debtor that the ca.sa. provided. See Riesen-
feld, Collection of Money Judgments, supra note 1, at 178 n.2 & accompanying text. See
generally Note, Body Execution, supra note 19. See also In re Acorn Elec. Supply, Inc., 348
F Supp. 277, 280 (E.D. Va. 1972).
25. VA. CODE § 8.01-466 (Repl. Vol. 1977), reads as follows:
On a judgment for money, it shall be the duty of the clerk of the court in
734
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circuit court, the plaintiff must wait twenty-one days from the date
of entry of judgment except when he can show "good cause."26
Writs based upon judgments rendered in the general district
courts, however, may be issued immediately 27 The request for is-
suance of the writ should be directed to the clerk of the court in
which the judgment is rendered.2 The fien factas then is given to
the proper officer of the court, generally the sheriff or his deputy,
for execution. 29 If the writ is issued against personalty that is lo-
cated outside the territorial jurisdiction of the issumng court, then
the writ must be sent from the clerk where the judgment is ren-
dered to the clerk of court where the property is located for execu-
tion.30 When the judgment has been rendered for specific personal
property, the creditor may elect between a fi.fa. and a writ of
possession. 1
Executions may issue against individuals3 2 and corporations.33
When the judgment is against several persons jointly, executions
may issue against some or all of the joint judgment debtors at the
which such judgment was rendered, upon request of the judgment creditor, his
assignee or his attorney, to issue a writ of fieri facias at the expiration of
twenty-one days from the date of the entry of the judgment and place the
same in the hands of the proper officer of such court to be executed and take
his receipt therefor. For good cause the court may order an execution to issue
on judgments and decrees at an earlier period.
Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. § 16.1-98. The only limitation on the issuing of a writ of fi.fa. under this section is
that it be requested by the plaintiff. Because this section was amended recently to allow the
request to be filed by a judgment creditor, his assignee, or his attorney in accord with §
8.01-466, note 25 supra, the failure to require that a writ not issue before 21 days after
judgment appears to be intentional.
28. Id. §§ 8.01-466, 16.1-98.
29. Id. § 8.01-466. Though the Code suggests that the writ is to be delivered by the clerk
to the sheriff, local practice frequently results in the clerk allowing the writ to be handcar-
rined by the creditor to the sheriffs office, particularly when the respective offices are located
in different buildings.
30. Early cases suggest that the writ must be sent to the jurisdiction where the debtor is
domiciled unless it can be shown that he has removed his tangible personalty elsewhere. See
Fleming v. Saunders, 8 Va. (4 Call) 563 (1803); Brydie v. Langham, 2 Va. (2 Wash.) 72
(1795). In actuality, it is common practice to have the writ of fi.fa. sent directly to the locale
in which the property is located regardless of the debtor's domicile.
31. VA. CODE § 8.01-472 (Repl. Vol. 1977). See McClure Grocery Co. v. Watson, 148 Va.
601, 139 S.E. 288 (1927).
32. VA. CODE § 8.01-468 (Rep. Vol. 1977).
33. Id.
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option of the creditor. 4 This is also true when the judgment
against one of several parties to a proceeding is entered at a differ-
ent time than judgment against the others.3 5 When a judgment de
bonis testatoris is had against the personal representative of a de-
cedent debtor, the execution is against the property of the testator
in the hands of the personal representative;"6 but if a judgment de
bonts propriis is had against the personal representative, the exe-
cution is against the personal assets of the representative, not the
decedent.3
7
When the debtor is covered by either a surety or a guarantor,
the creditor may sue them jointly The surety or guarantor is given
the right by statute to require the creditor to proceed first against
the principal individually, provided the creditor be given notice in
writing to this effect.3 s The creditor is then bound to bring an ac-
tion against the principal within thirty days or he forfeits any right
to hold the surety or guarantor liable under the obligation.39 When
the judgment is taken against the principal and the surety or guar-
34. Id. § 8.01-469.
35. Walker v. Commonwealth, 59 Va. (18 Gratt.) 13 (1867).
36. Beale's Adm'r v. Botetourt, 51 Va. (10 Gratt.) 278 (1853); VA. CODE § 64.1-144 (Repl.
Vol. 1973) provides that the personal representative may be sued upon any judgment
against the decedent. Section 64.1-157 specifies the order in which debts of the decedent are
to be paid. The provisions of this section have been held to be mandatory. Deering & Co. v.
Kerfoot, 89 Va. 491 (1892); Trevillian's Ex'rs v. Guerrant's Ex'rs, 72 Va. (31 Gratt.) 525
(1879). The personal representative may be personally liable if he pays a debt out of order.
McCormick's Ex'rs v. Wright's Ex'rs, 79 Va. 524 (1884); May v. Bentley, 8 Va. (4 Call) 528
(1800). VA. CODE § 64.1-169 provides for a cause of action against the surety of the personal
representative when an execution is returned unsatisfied. See Kent's Adm'r v. Cloyd's
Adm'r, 71 Va. (30 Gratt.) 555 (1878); Bush v. Beale, 42 Va. (1 Gratt.) 234 (1844); Meade v.
Brooking, 17 Va. (3 Munf.) 548 (1811). VA. CODE § 64.1-179 permits the personal representa-
tive to order creditors of the decedent to show cause why the estate should not be
distributed.
37. Moore's Ex'x v. Ferguson, 16 Va. (2 Munf.) 421 (1811); Barr v. Barr's Adm'r, 12 Va. (2
Hen. & Munf.) 26 (1808).
38. VA. CODE § 49-25 (Cum. Supp. 1979). The notice to the creditor also must notify him
that the failure to act will result in the loss of the surety or guarantor as security for the
debt. Although this additional notice requirement, which was added in 1979, does not spe-
cifically require that the creditor be informed that the suit must be brought within thirty
days, it would be prudent to do so.
39. Id. § 49-26 (Cum. Supp. 1979). The statute has been held to require the creditor to
sue only the solvent, resident principals on the contract and not other sureties. This is based
on the court's conclusion that the statute was designed to protect the surety's equity against
the principal, not to protect one surety against another. Colonial Am. Nat'l Bank v. Kos-
noski, 452 F Supp. 135 (W.D. Va. 1978).
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antor jointly, the creditor may proceed against either one.4 0 The
creditor is not bound to exhaust the assets of the principal before
execution can be levied on the surety. In fact, the creditor may
proceed directly against the surety even though the debtor has ad-
equate assets to satisfy the judgment, the theory being that, as far
as the creditor is concerned, all defendants are obligated equally.41
The writ of fi.fa. may be requested anytime within twenty years
after the date of judgment.42 The life of the judgment can be ex-
tended for another twenty-year period on the motion of the judg-
ment creditor or his assignee as long as the debtor is given proper
notice.'3 If the debtor has died and the creditor seeks to revive the
judgment against the decedent's representative, however, the mo-
tion must be made within two years from the date that the repre-
sentative qualifies and the judgment may only be revived for two
more years.44 Apparently, when the decedent's representative qual-
ifies for office more than two years before the expiration of the
judgment, the judgment may not be revived. Actions on judgments
from other states may be brought if the creditor could bring suit
under the laws of that state. The action must be commenced
within ten years, however, from the date of the state judgment.45
The life of the writ is determined by reference to the writ's re-
40. Grizzle v. Fletcher, 127 Va. 663, 105 S.E. 457 (1920); Manson & Shell v. Rawlings, 112
Va. 384, 71 S.E. 564 (1911); Humphrey v. Hitt, 47 Va. (6 Gratt.) 509 (1850).
41. Id. See also M. BURrs, COMMON LAW AND STATUTORY PLEADING AND PRACTICE 685 (4th
ed. 1952) [hereinafter cited as BuRrs, PLEADING AND PRACTICE].
42. VA. CODE § 8.01-251 (Repl. Vol. 1977). The paragraph reads, "No execution shall be
issued and no action brought on a judgment including a judgment m favor of the Common-
wealth, after twenty years from the date of such judgment, unless the period be extended
43. Id. Additional extensions may be granted on the same procedure. Id. The wording
used in the revival statute has the effect of extending the life of the old judgment rather
than creating a "new" judgment. This can create problems for the creditor who seeks to
enforce the judgment in a foreign state that has a shorter statute of limitations. See Umon
Nat'l Bank v. Lamb, 337 U.S. 38 (1949); M'Elmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 311 (1839).
Because personal serivce is required to be made on the debtor by the statute, however, it
can be argued that the revival has the effect of a new judgment. See Owens v. Henry, 161
U.S. 642, 646 (1896).
44. VA. CODE § 8.01-251.
45. Id. § 8.01-252. This section is the former § 8-22, which was revised m 1977 by omit-
ting the ten-year residency requirement because it possibly constituted a denial of due pro-
cess. VA. CODE COMM., RiT. TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA ON
REVISION OF TITLE 8 OF THE CODE OF VA., H. Doc. 14, at 164 (1977).
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turn date. The return date for writs issued by either the general
district court" or the circuit court 47 is ninety days. The judgment
creditor may request the issuance of as many executions as may be
necessary to satisfy the amount of the judgment,4 but he may not
employ executions to harass or otherwise oppress the debtor.49 If
the creditor can show that an earlier writ has not been executed,
that any amount of the judgment has not been satisfied, or that
the property levied on has been discharged by order of law, he
need not wait until the return date passes on an execution before
he requests that other writs issue.5
The party against whom a writ of fiert factas has been issued
may preempt execution by making a motion to quash to the court
from which the writ originated.5 1 The court then will stay execu-
tion until the motion has been considered if the moving party gives
reasonable notice to his opponent and provides a bond in an
amount satisfactory to the court.52 There is no time limit within
which the motion to quash must be made and the motion need not
46. VA. CODE § 16.1-199 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
47. VA. RuLE 3:2 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
48. VA. CODE § 8.01-475 (Repl. Vol. 1977). See the text of this section at note 50 infra.
See Richardson v. Wymer, 104 Va. 236, 51 S.E. 219 (1905).
49. Sutton v. Marye, 81 Va. 329, 334 (1886); Walker v. Commonwealth, 59 Va. (18 Gratt.)
13, 48 (1867); Puryear v. Taylor, 53 Va. (12 Gratt.) 401, 408 (1855).
50. VA. CODE § 8.01-475 (Repl. Vol. 1977) provides m appropriate part that
a party obtaining an execution may sue out other executions at his own costs,
though the return day of a former execution has not arrived; and may sue out
other executions at the defendant's costs, when on a former execution there is
a return by which it appears that the writ has not been executed, or that it or
any part of the amount thereof is not levied, or that property levied on has
been discharged by legal process which does not prevent a new execution on
the judgment. In no case shall there be more than one satisfaction for the same
money or thing.
And the fact that a judgment creditor may have availed himself of the bene-
fit of any other remedies under this chapter, shall not prevent him from issu-
ing, from time to time, without impairing his lien under it, other executions
upon his judgment until the same is satisfied.
Id.
51. Id. § 8.01-477. See notes 406-09 infra.
52. Id. On what constitutes reasonable notice, see Snavely v. Harkrader, 71 Va. (30
Gratt.) 487 (1878); Dillard v. Thornton, 70 Va. (29 Gratt.) 392 (1877); Ballard v. Whitlock,
59 Va. (18 Gratt.) 235 (1867). Generally, reasonableness is to be determined by the facts and
circumstances of each case. Hendricks v. Dundass, 2 Va. (2 Wash.) 50 (1875).
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be in writig.a3
Levy
After the execution has been issued, the next requirement is to
put the writ of fien facias into the hands of the sheriff or his dep-
uty This step was of critical importance until recently because de-
livery had the effect of creating a lien on all the debtor's person-
alty " Under the present statute, delivery of the writ to the sheriff
gives rise to a lien only on intangible property that otherwise can-
not be levied on;55 a lien on tangible personalty does not arise until
the sheriff actually levies on the property." The sheriff, upon re-
ceipt of the writ of fiert facias, immediately must endorse on it the
date and time.57 If he neglects to do so he may be liable to the
judgment creditor for damages.58
Having received the writ, the sheriff is duty-bound to execute it
promptly The officer making the levy is considered to be acting as
an agent of the plaintiff who retains the right to control the execu-
tion.5 19 Should the plaintiff decide against the levy, then the sheriff
may not proceed with the execution. 0 Likewise, the officer is
53. Dillard v. Thornton, 70 Va. (29 Gratt.) 392, 398 (1877).
54. For an early case applying the old rule, see Walker v. Commonwealth, 59 Va. (18
Gratt.) 13 (1867). See notes 119-20 infra & accompanying text.
55. VA. COD. § 8.01-501 (Repl. Vol. 1977). The text reads as follows:
Every writ of fieri facias shall, in addition to the lien it has under §§ 8.01-478
and 8.01-479 on what is capable of being levied on under those sections, be a
lien from the time it is delivered to the sheriff or other officer to be executed,
on all the personal estate of or to which the judgment debtor is, or may after-
wards and on or before the return day of such writ become, possessed or enti-
tled, except such as is exempt and except that, as against an assignee of
any such estate for valuable consideration, the lien by virtue of this section
shall not affect hun unless he had notice thereof at the time of the assignment.
Id.
56. Id. § 8.01-478. This section provides that
the writ of fieri facias may be levied as well on the current money and bank
notes, as on the goods and chattels of the judgment debtor, except such as are
exempt from levy and shall bind what is capable of being levied on only
from the time it is actually levied by the officer to-whom it has been delivered
to be executed.
Id.
57. Id. § 8.01-487. See Hockman v. Hockman, 93 Va. 455, 25 S.E. 534 (1896).
58. Id., see notes 97-114 infra & accompanying text.
59. Rowe v. Hardy, 97 Va. 674, 677, 34 S.E. 625, 626 (1899).
60. Humphrey v. Hitt, 47 Va. (6 Gratt.) 509, 526-27 (1850). See also Alcock v. Hill, 31 Va.
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bound to levy on the particular personal property that the judg-
ment creditor specifies. It has been suggested as a practical matter
that the creditor should instruct the sheriff on which personalty to
levy and its location, in order to avoid return of an unsatisfied writ
by the sheriff." Similarly, the sheriff should be directed to noncon-
sumer goods because existing security interests can be discovered
through a search of financing statements that are required to be
filed in the clerk's office.6 2 If the officer doubts whether the prop-
erty so specified may be levied on, or if multiple liens on the prop-
erty exist, he will require that the creditor furnish an indemnifymg
bond equal to the value of the property 63 Once the bond is pro-
vided, the officer must execute on and sell the property regardless
of whether it belongs to the debtor.6 4 If the bond is not given
within a reasonable time, the sheriff may refuse to levy on the
property; if he is already in possession, the officer may return the
property to the debtor.6 5
As mentioned above, the judgment creditor always has the op-
tion of abandoning the execution. He should be careful, however,
to secure the defendant's consent or, in the case of a surety and his
principal, the former's consent. A release by the creditor of goods
levied on operates to discharge the judgment at least as to the ex-
tent of the value of the goods released.6 If the action is taken with
the implied or express agreement of the debtor, however, a new
execution may issue. 7 The same is true when a levy has been
abandoned either at the request of the debtor or for his benefit.
For example, the debtor may request that he be given an opportu-
nity to sell the chattels on his own in an effort to secure a better
price than the goods would bring at an execution sale.
(4 Leigh) 622 (1833); M'Kenny v. Waller, 28 Va. (1 Leigh) 434 (1829).
61. JOINT COMMITTEE ON CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, ENFORCEMENT OF LIENS AND
JUDGMENTS IN VIRGINIA 175 (1977) [hereinafter cited as CLE, ENFORCEMENT OF LIENS].
62. Id., VA. CODE § 8.9-401(1)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
63. VA. CODE § 8.01-367 (Repl. Vol. 1977). Wheeler v. City Say. & Loan Corp., 156 Va.
402, 405-06, 157 S.E. 726, 727 (1931). See Davis v. Davis, 43 Va. (2 Gratt.) 363 (1845); Aylett
v. Roane, 42 Va. (1 Gratt.) 284 (1844); Stone v. Pointer, 19 Va. (5 Munf.) 287 (1816).
64. Wilson v. Butler, 17 Va. (3 Munf.) 559, 564-65 (1813).
65. Huffman v. Leffell, 73 Va. (32 Gratt.) 41, 46 (1879).
66. Walker v. Commonwealth, 59 Va. (18 Gratt.) 13, 46-48 (1867); Humphrey v. Hitt, 47
Va. (6 Gratt.) 509, 526 (1850).
67. Walker v. Commonwealth, 59 Va. (18 Gratt.) at 43.
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Levy is the process of designating for sale to Satisy the amount
of the judgment certain specific property belonging to the debtor. 8
Generally, this is done by actually seizing and taking possession of
the goods levied on, but this is not essential to a valid levy in Vir-
ginia. It is sufficient if the officer has the goods m his power and
view." In Palais v. DeJarnette,7 0 a deputy sheriff with a valid exe-
cution went to the home of the judgment debtor who was absent.
In the presence of a friend of the debtor, he made a detailed inven-
tory of the personal property, but made no effort to remove any of
the chattels.7 1 The deputy advised the debtor's friend that the
goods were levied on. Several months later, another writ of execu-
tion was issued on a different judgment and levy was effected by
seizure of the same goods previously levied on.7 2 The court upheld
the validity of the first levy on the basis that Virginia law did not
require actual seizure so long as the levying officer had the goods in
his view and power and noted that fact on his writ. 3 When the
sheriff merely has the goods in view but does not have the power to
take them, there is no levy.74 This would be the case, for example,
when the goods are visible through a window but the building is
locked and inaccessible to the officer. Under such circumstances, a
valid levy would be impossible until the officer gained access to the
goods.
Virginia law gives the levying officer the statutory authority to
use force under certain limited circumstances when necessary to
effectuate the levy Section 8.01-491 validates forceful entry into
any dwelling house during the daylight hours if the officer decides
such force is necessary to make the levy. 5 The officer is reqmred to
demand admittance of the occupant; any force he employs thereaf-
ter is subject to the additional requirement that the levy be carried
out in a reasonable manner.7 6 If any of these requirements are vio-
68. Id.
69. Bullitt's Ex'rs v. Winston, 15 Va. (1 Munf.) 269, 278-79 (1810). See also Dorrier v.
Masters, 83 Va. 459, 2 S.E. 927 (1887); Wardsworth v. Miller, 45 Va. (4 Gratt.) 99 (1847).
70. 145 F.2d 953 (4th Cir. 1944).
71. Id. at 954.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. BURKS, PLEADING AND PRACTICE, supra note 41, at 687-88.
75. VA. CODE § 8.01-491 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
76. Id. § 8.01-490.
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lated, the levy should be subject to challenge.
When the officer has no right to levy, as, for example, when he
uses force to enter the dwelling without first demanding admit-
tance, he likewise has no power to levy Consequently, he cannot
carry out a valid execution by having the goods within his view
because, by reason of his illegal entry, he lacked the concomitant
power to perfect the lien. If the levy can be challenged successfully,
then no lien ever attaches to the goods. The law therefore encour-
ages challenges to the levy, because without a valid levy, no lien
ever can exist.
The court in Palats also stated that no notice need be given to
the debtor to make the levy valid.77 The court felt that to impose
such a requirement would allow the debtor to avoid levy simply by
staying away from his property The court failed to consider, how-
ever, that notice of the levy could be posted on the premises where
the goods are located or, when practical, on the goods themselves.
The failure to require any type of notice raises a number of consti-
tutional questions about the procedure.7 8 The court did suggest no-
tice is advisable whenever possible, but held that the failure to do
so will not invalidate the levy The court attempted to justify this
position by noting that it has become common practice in Virginia
to allow the chattels to remain in the possession of the debtor as a
matter of convenience and economics.79 This argument has rele-
vance only m situations in which the levy does not result in
seizure. The court's holding, however, was not restricted to such
situations. Levy without notice or seizure creates the danger that
an innocent debtor subsequently could dispose of the property lev-
ied on to a bona fide purchaser, with the result that both parties to
the sale are ignorant of the levy that has created a lien in favor of
the judgment creditor superior to the rights of the purchaser.80
This is exactly the type of situation that the Revisers of the Code
intended to eliminate by changing the act which creates the lien
from delivery of the writ to the sheriff to actual levy on the goods
77. 145 F.2d at 955.
78. See note 405 infra & accompanying text.
79. 145 F.2d at 955.
80. See note 121 infra & accompanying text. See also CLE, ENFORCEMENT OF LIENS,
supra note 61, at 175.
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sought.81 Under the old rule, a bona fide purchaser taking from a
debtor would lose to the creditor if, at the time of the purchase,
the sheriff had in his possession an unexcuted writ.s2 Under the
new rule, a bona fide purchaser will lose to the creditor only when
he purchases goods after they have been levied on and left in pos-
session of the debtor, even when the debtor has no notice. Presum-
ably, the bona fide purchaser is in a better position under the new
rule for two reasons. First, a bona fide purchaser is less likely to
purchase goods with a superior lien outstanding because an inno-
cent debtor is more likely to know that a lien has attached under
the new law than under the old.88 Second, when the sheriff has left
the goods in the possession of the debtor and failed to require him
to provide a forthcoming bond, 4 the officer may be personally lia-
ble to the purchaser.8 5 Likewise, if the debtor, knowing of the levy,
nevertheless sells or disposes of the goods, he may be liable to
criminal prosecution for larceny.8 Regardless of these mitigating
factors, the inevitable conclusion is that the admirable goal of
making execution more equitable by postponing the lien until levy
has been partially frustrated by the failure to require that the
debtor be notified properly.
The execution must be levied on or before the return day 8 7 M
order to be valid.88 If the levy is made after the return day, it is
void and not binding on the creditor.8 ' But if the levy is made
before the return day, the sheriff may sell the property after the
return day has passed as long as the sale is held within a reasona-
ble time.90
81. VA. CODE Comm., RPT. TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA OF
REVISION OF TITLE 8 OF THE CODE OF VA., H. Doc. 14, at 288 (1977).
82. See, e.g., Evans v. Greenhow, 56 Va. (15 Gratt.) 153 (1859).
83. But see note 78 supra & accompanying text.
84. See notes 176-80 infra & accompanying text.
85. Bullitt v. Winston, 15 Va. (1 Munf.) 269, 281 (1810). See Carr v. Meade, 77 Va. 142
(1883). For a discussion of procedures whereby a creditor may compel the sheriff to act m
accordance with his statutory duties, see notes 97-114 infra & accompanying text.
86. BURKS, PLEADING AND PRACTICE, supra note 41, at 690 n.60.
87. See notes 46-47 supra & accompanying text.
88. Grandstaff v. Ridgely, Hampton & Co., 71 Va. (30 Gratt.) 1, 15 (1878); O'Bannon v.
Saunders, 65 Va. (24 Gratt.) 138, 142-43 (1873); Chapman v. Harrison, 25 Va. (4 Rand.) 336,
339 (1826).
89. Id.
90. Palms v. DeJarnette, 145 F.2d 953, 955 (4th Cir. 1944); VA. CODE § 8.01-479 (Repl.
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A sheriff must make a return on every writ that is given to him.91
A return on a. writ "is the short official statement of the officer
endorsed thereon of what he has done in obedience to the mandate
of the writ, or why he has done nothing."9 2 Under the present pro-
cedure, the sheriff must state the amount of money he has recov-
ered, if any, along with his fees and charges, the date and time of
levy and, when more than one defendant is mentioned in the writ,
on which defendant he levied.9" As noted, a return that is made
within a reasonable time after the return date is valid,9 4 provided
that the levy was made before the return date.95 When no return
date appears on a writ that has been returned, the presumption is
that the officer properly performed his duty by making the return
oii time.9
In those instances in which the sheriff or his deputy fails to
make a proper return, the creditor has available several statutory
remedies commonly referred to in other states as "amercement
proceedings. 91 7 An amercement is a penalty imposed by the court
issuing the writ on the sheriff for failing to make due return of a
writ of execution or of the proceeds of any monies collected in car-
rying out the process. The procedure is used rarely in Virginia,
possibly because many attorneys may be unaware that such sanc-
tions are available or possibly because those who are aware of them
doubt their effectiveness. Nevertheless, one practitioner in a neigh-
boring state has found that the amercement of neglectful sheriffs
had almost immediate beneficial results.9 8
Vol. 1977); see Moorman v. Board, 121 Va. 112, 92 S.E. 883 (1917); Grandstaff v. Ridgely, 71
Va. (30 Gratt.) 1 (1878); Paine v. Tutwiler, 68 Va. (27 Gratt.) 440 (1876); O'Bannon v. Saun-
ders, 65 Va. (24 Gratt.) 138 (1873); Chapman v. Harrison, 25 Va. (4 Rand.) 336 (1826).
91. VA. CODE § 8.01-483 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
92. Rowe v. Hardy, 97 Va. 674, 676, 34 S.E. 625, 626 (1899); see Slingluff v. Collins, 109
Va. 717, 64 S.E. 1055 (1909).
93. VA. CODE § 8.01-483 (Repl. Vol. 1977). For Code sections governing returns in general
district courts, see VA. CODE §§ 16.1-101, -102 (Repl. Vol. 1975).
94. Moorman v. Board, 121 Va. 112, 115, 92 S.E. 833, 834 (1917).
95. See note 90 supra & accompanying text.
96. Paine v. Tutwiler, 68 Va. (27 Gratt.) 440, 444 (1876); see Rowe v. Hardy, 97 Va. 674,
678, 34 S.E. 625, 626 (1899); BURKS, PLEADING AND PRACTICE, supra note 41, at 697.
97. Wyatt, Amercement of Sheriffs, 10 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 237 (1974).
98. Id. The author, a North Carolina practitioner, stated that he had
amerced nine sheriffs, some more than once. In these dozen or so cases, the
results have been amazing. In every case, save maybe one, when the notice,
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Section 15.1-80" requires that the day, manner of execution, and
name of the officer be inscribed on any order, warrant, or process
returned. If the service is made by a deputy, then he must sub-
scribe both his own name and that of his principal. Along with the
writ, the sheriff also must return any bond taken and make an ac-
count of sales made under the writ, specifying what was sold, the
purchaser, and the price received. The sheriff must make the re-
turn to the proper court. When a sale is made under the writ and
no time is specified for the return, the statute requires that the
return be made forthwith. The statute prescribes that the officer
shall forfeit twenty dollars if he fails to comply with the section,
and one hundred dollars if he makes a false return. If the officer
makes no return of a process issued by a court of record,"" then
the clerk must issue a rule returnable on the first day of the next
succeeding term of court, against the delinquent officer, directing
him to appear and show cause why he should not be fined.101 Pre-
sumably, it is within the discretion of the court to determine what
fine will be imposed. These penalties require no formal action on
the part of the creditor and, from the language of the statute, are
mandatory upon violation. 02
While section 15.1-80, discussed above, is applicable to any or-
der, warrant, or process, some confusion is created by section 8.01-
affidavits, and judgment nist were served upon the sheriff, he suddenly became
diligent. After receiving a new execution, he promptly executed and levied
upon the properties of the defendant and caused a satisfaction of the judg-
ment. Amercement causes quick action by the sheriff for he does not
fancy being required to show cause in open court why the judgment nzst should
not be made absolute.
Id. at 247.
99. VA. CODE § 15.1-80 (Curn. Supp. 1979).
100. By limiting the application of the penalty for failure to make a return of writs issued
by courts of record, the writs issued by general district courts that are courts not of record
evidently are excluded from coverage. Curiously, no such language of limitation can be
found in the preceding sentence regarding failure to comply with the requirements of the
section or making a false return; it therefore must be presumed that the penalties are appli-
cable regardless of from which court the writ originated.
101. VA. CODE § 15.1-80 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
102. When used in statutes the word "shall" is generally imperative or mandatory.
BLACK'S LAW DIcToNARY (4th rev. ed. 1968).
The penalty is a fine; the proceeds, unlike the analogous procedure in North Carolina, do
not go to the aggrieved party. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 162-8 to 21 (1972).
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483,10o which sets out a number of different requirements that the
sheriff must meet in order to make a valid return of a writ of fieri
facws. At first blush, one might conclude that failure to comply
with the return requirements of section 8.01-483 would give rise to
the sanctions set out in section 15.1-80.104 Such a conclusion, how-
ever, is unjustified. The section setting forth the requirements for a
return of any order, warrant, or process specifically states that the
fine applies to "[a]ny officer failing to comply with this section," 10 5
thereby precluding incorporation by implication of section 8.01-
483. No such limiting language accompanies the sanctions for false
return or failure to make a return and, arguably, the sheriff's non-
compliance with the stricter requirements of section 8.01-483 could
give rise to a fine against the officer for false return.
The creditor also may maintain an action against the officer for
failing to make or subscribe the return, or for making a false re-
turn.le6 A judgment rendered for failure to return or to make a
subscription does not bar further proceedings in the event the fail-
ure continues. 10 7 For each month subsequent to the judgment that
the failure continues, the sheriff shall be fined twenty dollars until
the return no longer can be made or the amount owed by the
debtor is paid.108 The court also is empowered to levy an additional
fine of a reasonable sum upon the motion of any party injured by
the continued delay Other fines are also within the discretion of
the court, subject to the limitation that they do not, in the aggre-
103. VA. CODE § 8.01-483 (Repl. Vol. 1977). See notes 91-93 supra & accompanying text.
For example, § 15.1-80 requires only that the officer note on the return the day and manner
of execution of the writ along with his signature. Section 8.01-483, however, requires the
sheriff to state whether he made a levy and, if so, the date and time of the levy. The re-
quirement that the time be noted in addition to the day (not required in § 15.1-80) is of
critical importance to levying creditors because it establishes the point at which the lien
created by the writ is perfected against subsequent levying creditors. VA. CODE § 8.01-478
(Repl. Vol. 1977); see, e.g., id. § 8.01-487 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
104. A note following § 8.01-483 m fact cross references to § 15.1-81 for failure to make a
return. The reference is probably an error and should be to § 15.1-80. The cross reference,
however, does not mention failure to comply or the making of a false return.
105. VA. CODE § 15.1-80 (Cum. Supp. 1979). The text reads in the appropriate part: "Any
officer failing to comply with this section shall forfeit twenty dollars and if he make a false
return shall forfeit therefor one hundred dollars." Id.
106. Id. § 15.1-81 (Repl. Vol. 1973). The court in Buttery v. Robbins, 177 Va. 368, 14
S.E.2d 544 (1941), recognized that a sheriff may be sued for defective service of process.
107. VA. CODE § 15.1-81 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
108. Id.
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gate, exceed five dollars per hundred of the amount of the writ for
each month the failure continues. 1 9
If an officer receives any money by virtue of any warrant, order,
or process or makes a return indicating he has received a sum of
money and then fails to make a proper return of it, the person
entitled to the money can recover against the officer and his sure-
ties the amount received plus fifteen percent annual interest until
payment.110 The statute creates a presumption that in a motion
against the officer, the fact that the fi.fa. has not been returned is
prima facie evidence that the entire amount of the writ has been
collected."'
When the officer fails to endorse on the writ of fi.fa. the date
and time that he receives it, and when he levies on the tangible
personalty of the debtor, the judgment creditor may make a mo-
tion to the court for recovery agamst the officer not to exceed
fifteen percent of the amount of the execution.11 2 Any officer re-
ceiving or collecting money on an execution must notify the person
entitled to the money within thirty days.11 3 If the officer fails to do
so and cannot show good cause for such failure, then he must be
fined between twenty and fifty dollars for each offense. 14
The sanctions available to both the creditor and the court pro-
vide a formidable array of weapons against the recalcitrant sheriff.
Because the sheriff is an elected official, he can in-afford to take
lightly the threat to his office that these procedures provide. The
diligent creditor should find them a valuable tool.
Lien of Execution
Lien on Tangibles v. Intangibles
The judgment itself creates a lien only on real estate in Virginia
and, then, only when it has been properly docketed. 5 In contrast,
109. Id.
110. Id, § 15.1-85 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
111. Id. See also Paxton v. Rich, 85 Va. 378, 7 S.E. 31 (1888).
112. VA. CODE § 8.01-487 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
113. Id. § 8.01-500.
114. Id.
115. Id. § 8.01-458. See generally Wiltshire, The New Judgment Lien in Lands, 1 U.
RicH. L. RE v. 313 (1962). Enforcement is by a bill m equity. VA: CODE § 8.01-462 (Repl. Vol.
1977).
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the lien of a writ of ien facias varies in territorial scope, duration,
and effect depending on the type of property involved. At common
law, the lien created by a fi.fa. attached from the teste of the writ,
which, for all practical porposes, was the day of judgment.' i This
was changed by the Statute of Frauds to make the lien effective
from the tine the writ was delivered to the sheriff.117 Under this
system, the writ became a lien on every kind of personal property
regardless of whether it was tangible or intangible. 118 Revision of
the Code of Virginia in 1977 changed the fi.fa. significantly by
postponing the creation of the lien on tangible personal property
until the property was actually levied on.119 The lien on intangibles
which, by definition, are incapable of being levied on, still arises at
the tune the writ is delivered into the hands of the sheriff.120
The liens have different effects on the rights of purchasers. If the
property is tangible personalty, the lien created by the levy of the
fien factas is superior to the rights of subsequent purchasers re-
gardless of whether the purchaser has notice of the levy.1 21 On the
other hand, when the property is intangible, an assignee for valua-
ble consideration without notice will defeat the judgment creditor's
lien. 1 22 Also, a third party making payment to the debtor is not
liable to the judgment creditor under the lien on intangibles unless
he is served with written notice of the lien, signed by plaintiff or
his attorney, specifying the following: 1) name of the debtor, 2)
name of the creditor, 3) amount of the judgment, 4) date of the
judgment, 5) date and return date of execution, and 6) date execu-
tion was delivered. 128
As a practical matter, most creditors' attorneys have standard-
116. See generally S. RIESENFELD, CREDITORS' REMEDIES AND DEBTORS' PROTECTION 100
(1967); FREEMAN ON EXECUTIONS, supra note 21, § 199.
117. Id.
118. Frayser v. R. & A. R. R., 81 Va. 388, 392-93 (1886); Trevillian's Ex'rs v. Guerrant's
Ex'rs, 72 Va. (31 Gratt.) 525, 527 (1879); Charron & Co. v. Boswell, 59 Va. (18 Gratt.) 216,
230 (1868); Puryear v. Taylor, 53 Va. (12 Gratt.) 401, 408 (1855). See also BURKS, PLEADING
AND PRACTICE, supra note 41, at 703.
119. See note 56 supra & accompanying text.
120. See note 55 supra & accompanying text.
121. Evans v. Greenhow, 56 Va. (15 Gratt.) 153, 161 (1859).
122. VA. CODE § 8.01-501 (Repl. Vol. 1977). See note 55 supra & accompanying text;
Trevillian's Ex'rs v. Guerrant's Ex'rs, 72 Va. (31 Gratt.) 525 (1879); Charron & Co. v. Bos-
well, 59 Va. (18 Gratt.) 216 (1868); Evans v. Greenhow, 56 Va. (15 Gratt.) 153 (1859).
123. VA. CODE § 8.01-502 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
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ized forms that satisfy the statutory requirements for notice that
they will have served on any banks at which the debtor is known to
have an account. If the debtor's bank is unknown and the size of
the judgment makes it practicable, the diligent creditor may send
out notices to all the area banks in which funds may be located.124
This notice serves to freeze the debtor's assets in those accounts
until a garnishment summons can issue. When the debtor has
funds in an out-of-state bank, however, the notice will have no ef-
fect because the lien itself extends only to property located within
the state.
The territorial scope of the lien on tangible personalty is limited
to the jurisdiction of the sheriff to whom the writ of fien facias is
given for execution; that is, the city or county limits. 125 The lien on
intangibles, on the other hand, extends throughout the entire
state.
128
The duration of the lien also varies depending on the type of
property Under section 8.01-479 of the Virginia Code, "the lien of
a writ of fiert facias, on what is capable of being levied on but is
not levied on under the writ on or before the return day thereof,
shall cease on that day.1 2 7 This section applies to liens on tangible
property generally, but the wording was left intact in the 1977 re-
vision that changed the nature of the lien on tangible personal
property 1 28 Since the revision, the lien is contingent upon a valid
levy being made. The lien cannot be terminated on the return date
if no levy has been made because it never existed.1 29 Consequently,
the logical conclusion is that this subsection is irrelevant and that
the duration of the lien is established by the time within which the
sheriff reasonably could have sold tangible property that has been
subjected to a valid levy.130
The duration of a lien on intangibles differs significantly from
124. As to the rights of the bank under such circumstances, see VA. CoDE § 8.4-303 (Ad-
ded Vol. 1965).
125. Id. § 8.01-481 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
126. Id.
127. Id. § 8.01-479.
128. This is the old § 8-412 that has been renumbered but otherwise remains unchanged.
The revisers made no comment concerning this section given the change in § 8.01-478. See
note 56 supra.
129. VA. CODE § 8.01-478; see note 56 supra.
130. See Palais v. DeJarnette, 145 F.2d 953, 955 (4th Cir. 1944).
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the lien on chattels and goods. This lien is effective for one year
from the return date on the execution or, when the intangible is a
debt due from a third party, one year from the determination of
the amount owed, whichever is longer. Sl The lien ceases when the
judgment creditor no longer can enforce the judgment; that is, no
longer than twenty years after the judgment has been rendered,
unless the judgment is extended.3 2 Likewise, the lien on in-
tangibles terminates whenever the creditor is prevented from pur-
suing the judgment because the debtor has given and forfeited a
forthcoming bond 3 3 or because legal process so orders.134 A lien on
the debtor's choses in action is not defeated by his death or the
death of his creditor if the lien arose during the defendant's life.
The action may be pursued in a suit against the decedent's assets
in the hands of the personal representative; 3 5 however, no lien can
be established on the estate of a debtor after his death. The writ of
scire facias, which before the revision would have been necessary
to revive the judgment following decedent's death, has been abol-
ished. Therefore, a suit against the decedent debtor's estate appar-
ently may be brought at any time during the twenty-year life of
the judgment.'
131. VA. CODE § 8.01-505 (Repl. Vol. 1977). The text reads as follows:
The lien acquired under § 8.01-501 on intangibles shall cease whenever the
right of the judgment creditor to enforce the judgment by execution or by ac-
tion, or to extend the right by motion, ceases or is suspended by a forthcoming
bond being given and forfeited or by other legal process. Furthermore, as to all
such intangibles the lien shall cease upon the expiration of the following peri-
ods whichever is the longer: (1) one year from the return day of the executions
to which the lien arose, or (ii) if the intangible is a debt due from, or a claim
upon, a third person in favor of the judgment debtor or the state of such third
person, one year from the final determination of the amount owed to the judg-
ment debtor.
Id.
132. Id. See Boisseau v. Bass, 100 Va. 207, 40 S.E. 647 (1902); Hicks v. Roanoke Brick
Co., 94 Va. 741, 27 S.E. 596 (1897), overruled on other grounds, 100 Va. 207, 40 S.E. 647
(1902). As to extension of the judgment, see notes 43-44 supra & accompanying text.
133. VA. CODE § 8.01-505; see note 131 supra; notes 176-80 infra & accompanying text.
134. Id.
135. Trevillian's Ex'rs v. Guerrant's Ex'rs, 72 Va. (31 Gratt.) 525 (1879).
136. See CLE, ENFORc EMENT OF LIENS, supra note 61, at 171. The requirement under §
8.01-251 that a motion to extend the judgment must be brought within two years of the
personal representative's qualification does not apply to an action based on the original
judgment.
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Finally, the Code revision making the lien attach at levy instead
of delivery has the effect of restricting the lien to the specific prop-
erty actually levied on. Under the old law, the lien attached to all
the debtor's personalty, including property acquired after delivery
of writ but before the return date.13 7 Therefore, the scope of the
lien is diminished significantly by the 1977 revision insofar as tan-
gible property is concerned. This is not so for the lien on in-
tangibles that is created when the writ of fi.fa. is delivered to the
sheriff."3 8 This lien attaches to all property incapable of being lev-
ied on that the debtor owns on the delivery date or subsequently
acquires before the return date.13 9 The lien does not attach, how-
ever, to exempt property or property subject to an assignment
when the assignee for valuable consideration takes without notice.
Priorties
Priorities among lienholders are resolved in much the same man-
ner as before the revision except that now the point of reference
for perfecting the lien on tangible personalty is the time of actual
levy The old system, under which the lien arose when the writ was
delivered to the sheriff, more often than not resulted in inequities
among competing creditors that could not be justified on any pol-
icy basis. 140 For example, the general rule was that when several
executions, existed against the same property, the first writ to be
delivered prevailed even when the junior creditor levied first.14 1
Because the lien attached to all the debtor's property, a creditor
who did not know the whereabouts of any personalty could take
out a writ of execution and wait for a more diligent junior creditor
to discover some leviable assets that then could be claimed on the
bases of the senior lien.
The new system avoids such problems because the lien attaches
137. See BURKS, PLEADING AND PRAcTzcE, supra note 41, at 703.
138. See note 61 supra.
139. Id.
140. For some of the problems typical to states in which the lien attaches when the writ is
delivered to the sheriff, see Distler and Shubm, Enforcement of Priorities and Liens: The
New York Judgment Creditors' Rights in Personal Property, 60 COLUM. L. REv 1196
(1935). See also the dissent in Pegram v. May, 36 Va. (9 Leigh) 176, 180-81 (1838).
141. Charron & Co. v. Boswell, 59 Va. (18 Gratt.) 216 (1868); Foreman v. Lloyd, 29 Va. (2
Leigh) 309 (1830).
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not only in a manner more likely to give notice to junior creditors,
but also in a way that specifies the particular property subject to
the levy When several writs are delivered on the same day to the
sheriff against the same property, the order of delivery determines
the order of satisfaction. 14 2 When several writs are delivered to the
sheriff simultaneously, the proceeds from the sale of goods levied
on are apportioned ratably 143 But when the sheriff demands an
indemnity bond and not all of the executing creditors comply, then
the sale proceeds are divided only among those creditors providing
a bond.144
Case law on the question of priorities among execution liens and
other kinds of liens may have different results when examined in
the context of the new law. For example, in Pegram v. May145, a
writ of fieri factas based on a valid judgment was issued and deliv-
ered to the sheriff for execution. Before levy could be carried out,
the debtor executed a deed of trust on the property which he
promptly recorded. Later, levy was made on the goods after they
were in the hands of a subsequent purchaser. 146 The Virginia Su-
preme Court held that the purchaser of the goods at the execution
sale took priority over the lien of the deed of trust because the
execution lien was first in time. 47 Today, the outcome would be
exactly the opposite. Since the deed of trust was recorded prior to
the actual levy on the goods, the deed lienholder, being first in
time to perfect his lien on the property, would prevail over the
subsequent execution lien. 148
142. VA. CoDE § 8.01-488 (Repl. Vol. 1977). The text reads as follows:
Of writs of fieri facias, that which was first delivered to the officer, though two
or more be delivered on the same day, shall be first levied and satisfied, and
when several such executions are delivered to the officer at the same time they
shall be satisfied ratably. But if an indemnifying bond be required by the of-
ficer as a prerequisite to a sale, and the same to be given by some of the credi-
tors and not by others, and the officer sells under protection of such bond, the
proceeds of the sale shall be paid to the creditors giving the bond in the order
in which their liens attached.
Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. 36 Va. (9 Leigh) 176 (1838).
146. Id. at 177-78.
147. Id. at 179-80.
148. See note 56 supra & accompanying text.
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On the other hand, an old case involving competing garnishment
and execution lien claims would have the same result under to-
day's law. In Puryear v. Taylor149, the senior creditor obtained
judgment against the debtor and had several executions issued
that were returned unsatisfied. Later, the junior creditor sued the
debtor and had an attachment by garnishment issued and served
on the garnishee. The senior creditor then sued out a garnishment
against the same garnishee asserting his claim was senior because
it derived from the lien created by his earlier unsatisfied execution.
The court agreed and held that the writ of fiert facias created a
lien that was superior even though the garnishment by attachment
was served on the garnishee first.150 The outcome under the new
law would be the same because a debt owed by a third party to the
debtor is a chose m action that is subject to the lien of the fierl
facias when the writ is delivered to the sheriff; the fact that the
writ was returned unsatisfied is irrelevant as long as the subse-
quent garnishment arises before the lien ceases.151
Two consecutive holdings by the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia have clouded the issue over pri-
orities among garnishment creditors. In First National Bank of
Norfolk v. Norfolk & Western Railway,1 52 the court held that a
judgment creditor's lien on a debt in the hands of a garnishee does
not arise until the garnishment summons is issued; therefore, a tax
lien perfected prior to issuance would prevail over the lien of the
creditor.153 Only a year later, however, the same court in In re
149. 53 Va. (12 Gratt.) 401 (1855).
150. Id. at 409. See also Erskine v. Staley, 39 Va. (12 Leigh) 406 (1841).
151. See note 55 supra & accompanying text.
152. 327 F Supp. 196 (E.D. Va. 1971).
153. Id. at 199. The court cited § 8-411 of the Virginia Code (the present § 8.01-478, see
note 56 supra) which created a lien on tangibles and intangibles from the time the writ of
fiern facias was delivered lo the sheriff and § 8-441 (the present § 8.01-511) which imposed
liability on the garnishee by reason of the lien of the writ of fi.fa. Although these two sec-
tions are consistent with the interpretation that a lien is created by the writ, not the issu-
ance of the garnishment summons, the court made no reference to the writ or the date of its
delivery to the sheriff. Because a live fi.fa. is a prerequisite to the issuance of a garnishment
summons, note 158 infra, theoretically, the two cannot arise simultaneously. Consequently,
had the writ issued before the tax lien was perfected, the judgment creditor should have
prevailed even though the garnishment summons was subsequent to the tax lien. The court
never addressed tins possibility.
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Acorn Electric Supply, Inc. 54 held that the writ of fi.fa. created
the lien, not the garnishment summons. The court contended that
the garnishment summons does not create the lien but is merely a
means of enforcing it. 155 The court acknowledged the inconsistency
between the two decisions but sought to justify its holding on the
ground that the Virginia Code recognizes a lien created by garnish-
ment summons in the context of prejudgment attachment and gar-
nishment, but not when the summons is used in the postjudgment
period.1 56 This reasoning is sound given the explicit wording in the
statute that the lien on intangibles arises at the moment the writ is
delivered to the sheriff.157 The garnishment itself does not create a
lien upon specific property in the garnishee's possession; rather it
creates a right in the creditor to hold the garnishee liable for the
value of the property he holds if he delivers it to the debtor. 58
Accordingly, the relative priority among execution creditors to the
amount held by the garnishee should be determined by the order
in which the writs of fiert facias are delivered to the sheriff.5 9
The rights of a purchaser for value from the debtor also have
been affected by the change in the statute relating to tangibles. In
McKinley v. Ensell,1 60 a bona fide purchaser of personal property
took good title against the creditors of the seller only if he man-
aged to take possession of the goods before the writ of execution
was issued against the seller." 1 Under the present system, a bona
154. 348 F Supp. 277 (E.D. Va. 1972).
155. Id. at 282.
156. Id. Both First National Bank and Acorn Supply involved garnishment in the
postjudgment period. To add to the confusion, the court in Acorn Supply interpreted First
National Bank to state that the lien was effective from the date the garnishment summons
was delivered to the garnishee, when in fact the court explicitly stated that the lien is cre-
ated when it is issued to the officer. See note 131 supra.
157. See note 55 supra & accompanying text.
158. Knight v. People's Nat'l Bank, 182 Va. 380, 391, 29 S.E.2d 364, 370 (1944). A gar-
nishment summons issues on the request of a judgment creditor who has a writ of execution
that is unsatisfied. This method allows the creditor to enforce the execution against the
third party's liability to the debtor that is the object of the judgment. VA. CODE § 8.01-511
(Repl. Vol. 1977). The amount of money that the garnishee owes to the debtor must be
ascertainable and absolute in order to be subject to garnishment. Lynch v. Johnson, 196 Va.
516, 84 S.E.2d 419 (1954).
159. See note 55 supra & accompanying text. But see D. EPSTEIN, DEBTOR-CREDITOR RE-
LATIONS IN A NUTSHELL 58 (1973) (service of summons creates a lien).
160. 43 Va. (2 Gratt.) 334 (1845).
161. Id. at 340.
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fide purchaser need only take possession before the levy is actually
made in order to defeat the claims of the vendor's creditors. When
the goods are levied on but left in the hands of the debtor,162 how-
ever, the innocent purchaser is still prey to creditors regardless of
the lack of notice of the levy.163
Third Party Claims
The creditor often may issue a writ of fi.fa. against personalty in
the hands of the debtor only to find that it is claimed by a third
party The procedures for resolving the title dispute differ depend-
ing on the level of court issuing the writ. When the circuit court is
the source of the fi.fa., Virginia law provides that either the credi-
tor, the claimant, or the sheriff may apply to the circuit court
where the property is located to try the claim."" If the claimant is
the movant, he first must provide a suspending bond 1 5 and then,
within thirty days, institute proceedings to settle the dispute over
the title.6 8 When the claimant fails to satisfy either of these re-
quirements, he is barred thereafter from pursuing the claim, and
the sheriff may levy against the property without fear of
liability 6 7
The sheriff in possession of the writ also may intitiate proceed-
ings in the circuit court unless the creditor has given him an in-
demnifying bond.6 8 Generally, however, the sheriff always will re-
162. See text accompanying note 73 supra.
163. See note 121 supra & accompanying text.
164. VA. CODE § 8.01-365 (Repl. Vol. 1977); United States v. Lawler, 201 Va. 686, 112
S.E.2d 921 (1960). The Code section is restricted to situations in which the lien already has
been perfected against the goods. Accordingly, third party claims may not be asserted m
anticipation of levy on tangibles or prior to the delivery of the writ to the sheriff in the case
of intangibles.
165. The suspending bond has the effect of suspending the authority of the sheriff to
execute the writ any further; thus, he cannot sell the goods levied on until the issue of title
is resolved. The bond must be of an amount equal to double the value of the property and
made payable to the officer. The bond may be sued upon in the name of the officer by any
person who sustains injuries as a result of the suspension. VA. CODE § 8.01-370 (Repl. Vol.
1977).
166. Id., Fields-Watkins Co. v. Hensley, 117 Va. 661, 86 S.E. 113 (1915).
167. VA. CODE § 8.01-367 (Repl. Vol. 1977); Bosewell v. Lipscomb, 172 Va. 33, 200 S.E.
736 (1939).
168. VA. CODE § 8.01-365 (ii) (Repl. Vol. 1977). The purpose of an indemnifying bond is to
indemnify the sheriff against personal liability at the hands of third party claimants. Be-
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quire a bond under such circumstances. If the-judgment creditor
refuses to provide one within a reasonable time, the officer may
refuse to levy on the property or, when he already has levied, he
may return the goods to the person who was previously in posses-
sion.16 9 When the bond is provided, the officer is bound to execute
the writ by levying on the property 170
Writs of excution issued by the general district courts are gov-
erned by different Code sections when a dispute arises over the
title to the property, though the results are very similar. The
claimant, the officer in possession of the writ, or the party who had
the process issued, may apply to the court to try the title.17 If the
applicant files an affidavit stating that the value of the property
does not exceed $5,000, then the court will issue a summons to
both the debtor and the creditor requiring them to show cause why
the property should not be discharged from the writ. 71 When the
value of the property is over $1,000, any party may have the pro-
ceedings removed to the circuit court;173 otherwise, the court will
have a hearing to decide the question of title. 4 If the property
involved is worth more than fifty dollars, an appeal of right is
available to the losing party 175
Relief from Levy
A debtor whose property is subject to execution may continue to
possess and use the goods by giving the levying officer a forthcom-
mg bond payable to the creditor. 76 The bond is available as a mat-
cause the execution creditor is the interested party, he must provide the bond. See Wheeler
v. City Sav. & Loan Corp., 156 Va. 402, 157 S.E. 726 (1931).
169. VA. CODE § 8.01-367 (Repl. Vol. 1977); Huffman v. Leffell, 73 Va. (32 Gratt.) 41
(1879).
170. Stone v. Pointer, 19 Va. (5 Munf.) 287, 291 (1816).
171. VA. CODE § 16.1-119 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
172. Id. § 16.1-120.
173. Id. § 16.1-122.
174. Id. § 16.1-121 (Repl. Vol. 1975).
175. Id. § 16.1-122 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
176. Id. § 8.01-526 (Repl. Vol. 1977) provides as follows:
The Sheriff or other officer levying a writ of fien factas may take from the
debtor a bond, with sufficient surety, payable to the creditor, reciting the ser-
vice of such writ or warrant, and the amount due thereon, including the of-
ficer's fee for taking the bond, commissions, and other lawful charges, if any,
with condition that the property shall be forthcoming at the day and place of
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ter of right, and the levying officer must accept the bond if offered
upon the condition that the debtor agree to deliver the goods on
the day and at the place of sale.1 7 The debtor remains liable for
the goods during this period and failure to deliver the goods as
agreed results in forfeiture of the bond. 78 The lien created by the
levy remains in effect until the bond is forfeited, at which time it is
extinguished and a judgment is created against the surety."" No
execution may issue on the judgment, but the obligors on the bond
are liable, and the creditor in whose name the bond was issued
may recover by motion or action.18 0
PROPERTY SUBJECT TO ExECUTION
The writ of fier facias authorizes the sheriff to levy on money
and bank notes as well as goods and chattels of the debtor.8" Exe-
cution cannot levy on real estate18 2 or property that has been ex-
empted specifically by statute.18 3 The general rule is that all the
personalty of the debtor that can be transferred voluntarily may be
subjected to execution;184 the debtor, though, must have some
vested interest in the property. Personalty on loan to the debtor
cannot be levied on by his creditors on the basis of his possession
of the property 185
sale; whereupon, such property may be permitted to remain in the possession
and at the risk of the debtor.
Id.
177. BURKS, PLEADING AND PRACTICE, supra note 41, at 699. In certain cases, however, a
forthcoming bond is precluded by statute. VA. CODE § 8.01-531 (Repl. Vol. 1977). These
situations arise when 1) the execution is on a forthcoming bond; 2) the execution is against
the sheriff, his deputy or surety in specified circumstances; 3) the execution is required by
law to be endorsed "no security taken." Id.
178. Lusk v. Ramsay, 17 Va. (3 Munf.) 417, 429-30 (1811).
179. VA. CODE § 8.01-527 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
180. Id. § 8.01-528. See Allen v. Hart, 59 Va. (18 Gratt.) 722 (1868).
181. VA. CODE § 8.01-478, supra note 56.
182. Davis v. National Grange Ins. Co., 281 F Supp. 998 (E.D. Va. 1968). See also Allen
v. Clark, 126 F 738 (4th Cir. 1903). The judgment creates a lien on the realty of the debtor
that must be enforced by a bill in equity. See note 115 supra.
183. Properties exempt from levy are detailed in VA. CODE §§ 34-1 to 28. See also CLE,
ENFORCEMENT OF LIENS, supra note 61, at 176-78.
184. FREEMAN ON ExEcuTioNs, supra note 21, § 110.
185. Sauls v. Andrews & Co., 163 Va. 407, 175 S.E. 760 (1934); Beale v. Digges, 47 Va. (6
Gratt.) 582 (1850); Rose v. Burgess, 37 Va. (10 Leigh) 193 (1839); Pate v. Baker, 35 Va. (8
Leigh) 80 (1837).
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Stocks and Bonds
At common law, stocks and bonds were considered choses in ac-
tion and therefore were not subject to seizure and sale under exe-
cution.18 6 The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), however, specifi-
cally provides for securities or shares of stock to be levied on by
judgment creditors.1 87 The UCC, like the Uniform Stock Transfer
Act before it, has the effect of making stock certificates fully nego-
tiable.""8 The certificates themselves constitute the property for
purposes of levy In order for the shares to be subjected to levy,
they must actually be seized by the officer enforcing the fiert
facias.1'5 When the shares have been returned to the corporation
issuing them, the sheriff may levy on the stocks at the source.1 90
In contrast, when the debtor has pledged the securities as collat-
eral, the requirement of actual seizure presents a dilemma to which
the Code provides no answer. As presently written, the creditor of
the pledgor has no way to levy on the pledgor's equity interest in
the pledged security without depriving the pledgee of his collat-
eral.' 91 Furthermore, the prescription that the shares be seized
physically is in conflict with the statutory section that allows levy
on tangibles to take place when the goods are in view and capable
of being levied on. 9 2 Though this issue has not been resolved, the
Code provision has the effect of making stocks and securities a
form of property distinct from either tangible or intangible person-
alty, at least insofar as the procedural requirements for perfecting
the levy are concerned. Additionally, the Code provides the courts
186. See FREEMAN ON EXECUTIONS, supra note 21, § 7.
187. VA. CODE § 8.8-317(1) (Added Vol. 1965) provides that
[n]o attachment or levy upon a security or any share or other interest evi-
denced thereby which is outstanding shall be valid until the security is actually
seized by the officer making the attachment or levy but a security which has
been surrendered to the issuer may be attached or levied upon at the source.
A security is defined broadly to include any instrument that "evidences a share, participa-
tion or other interest in property or in an enterprise or evidences an obligation of the is-
suer." Id. § 8.8-102(1)(a).
188. Id. § 8.8-105(1). See also Frost v. Davis, 288 F.2d 497, 498 (5th Cir. 1961); RIESEN-
FELD, CREDITORS' REMEDIES AND DEBTORS' PROTECTION 125 (1967).
189. VA. CODE § 8.8-317(1), supra note 187.
190. Id.
191. Kennedy, The Rights of Levying Creditors Against Negotiable Property Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 31 Bus. LAW. 1517, 1527-28 (1976).
192. See notes 73-74 supra & accompanying text.
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with the power to compel the debtor to bring shares located out of
state into Virginia and deliver them to the sheriff possessing a writ
of execution.
19 3
Negotiable Documents of Title
The UCC permits a judgment creditor to levy on a negotiable
document of title.194 Section 8.7-602 of the Code of Virginia pro-
vides that goods covered by a negotiable document of title can be
reached by judicial process only when the document of title is sur-
rendered to the bailee or after further negotiation of the document
has been enjoined by a court.9 5 The purpose of this restriction is
to protect the bailee against conflicting claims by the holder of the
document and the judgment creditor of the bailor.""8 Further pro-
tection is afforded the purchaser of a document of title who takes
without notice of the injunction by allowing him to take free of the
lien. 1 97 This section, like the section applicable to stock certificates,
creates another exception to Virginia's law of execution by requir-
ing actual seizure to perfect the levy. The idea that an injunction
against further negotiation gives rise to a lien on the documents is
unique to this particular type of instrument. 9 " The most serious
obstacle, however, is that an injunction against further negotiation
can be effective only if the holder of the document is subject to the
193. Inter-Regional Financial Group, Inc. v. Hashemi, 562 F.2d 152, 155 (2nd Cir. 1977);
Fleming v. Grey Mfg. Co., 352 F Supp. 724, 726 (D. Conn. 1973). But see Nederlandsche
Handel-Maatschappj N.V v. Sentry Corp., 163 F Supp. 800, 803 (E.D. Va. 1958).
194. VA. CODE §8.7-602 (Added Vol. 1965) provides that
[e]xcept where the document was originally issued upon delivery of the goods
by a person who had no power to dispose of them, no lien attaches by virture
of any judicial process to goods m the possession of a bailee for which a negoti-
able document of title is outstanding unless the document be first surrendered
to the bailee or its negotiation enjoined, and the bailee shall not be compelled
to deliver the goods pursuant to process until the document is surrendered to
him or impounded by the court. One who purchases the document for value
without notice of the process or injunction takes free of the lien imposed by
the judicial process.
Id.
195. Id.
196. See id. Official Comment 1.
197. One commentator has noted an evident lack of understanding by the draftsmen of
the Code as to the distinction between judgment creditors and judgment liens. See Ken-
nedy, The Rights of Levying Creditors, supra note 191, at 1517-18.
198. See, e.g., note 189 supra & accompanying text.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
court's jurisdiction. 9 Finally, the creditor should bear m mmd
that this Code section does not apply to nonnegotiable documents
of title. In such cases, the judgment creditor may proceed directly
against the goods themselves in the hands of the bailee, either
through garnishment or the interrogatory procedure whenever
practical.
Fixtures
Generally, fixtures are considered part of the realty and there-
fore are not subject to levy under a fi.fa. when the debtor owns
both the real estate and the fixtures.200 In order to reach the
fixtures on the land, the creditor must proceed against the re-
alty 201 Personalty is considered to be a fixture if it is permanent in
character and so essential to the purposes of the building that it
cannot be removed without lasting damage to either.0 2
Crops and Livestock
Growing crops, regardless of kind, cannot be subjected to levy
until they have been severed from the land.25 Livestock, including
horses, may be levied on though the sheriff is responsible for their
care while he is in possession,0 4 which may prove both costly and
impractical.
Property Subject to Prior Lien
Section 8.01-480 permits a judgment creditor to have a writ of
fi.fa. levied on tangible personal property that is subject to a prior
lien or in which the debtor has only an equitable interest.20 5 This
.199. Kennedy, Rights of Levying Creditors, supra note 191, at 1519-20.
200. Hasken Wood Vulcanizing Co. v. Cleveland Shipbldg. Co., 94 Va. 439, 447, 26 S.E.
878, 880 (1897).
201. See note 115 supra & accompanying text. See, e.g., VA. CODE § 8.9-313 (Cum. Supp.
1979).
202. Green v. Phillips, 67 Va. (26 Gratt.) 752, 762-63 (1875). See also note 183 supra, at
447.
203. VA. CODE § 8.01-489 (Repl. Vol. 1977). See id. § 34-27 (Repl. Vol. 1976); Note, Crops
- Personalty or Realty in Virginia?, 37 VA. L. REV. 1115 (1953).
204. VA. CODE § 8.01-490 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
205. Id. § 8.01-480 reads as follows:
Tangible personal property subject to a prior lien, or in which the execution
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section derives from earlier law governing chattel mortgages and
conditional sales contracts that now are governed by article 9 of
the UCC, which rejects the common law "lien theory" as a basis
for establishing security interests.0 6 Accordingly, the statute has
limited application at the present time. Technically, for example, it
would apply to situations in which a prior creditor has levied on
tangibles but allowed the property to remain in the hands of the
debtor and thereby has become susceptible to levy by a subsequent
judgment creditor.20 7
When the statute does apply, if the lien is due and payable when
the levy is made, then the sheriff must sell the property free of the
lien and apply the proceeds first to the prior lien and then the
balance to the amount of the judgment. 208 If the lien is not due,
then the goods can be sold subject to the lien. 9
Estates in Personalty210
Virginia allows personal property to be held by joint tenancy
with right of survivorship 11 or by tenancy m common. 2  The right
to hold personalty as tenancy by the entirety apparently is recog-
nized in Virginia as a result of the Supreme Court of Appeals deci-
sion in Oliver v. Givens.213 In Oliver, the court held that the pro-
debtor has only an equitable interest, may nevertheless be levied on for the
satisfaction of a fieri facias. If such prior lien be due and payable, the officer
levying the fieri facias shall sell the property free of such lien, and apply the
proceeds first to the payment of such lien, and the residue so far as necessary,
to the satisfaction of the fieri facias. If such prior lien be not due and payable
at the time of sale, such officer shall sell the property levied on subject to such
lien.
Id. This statute was applied in Wheeler v. City Say. & Loan Corp., 156 Va. 402, 157 S.E. 726
(1931).
206. See VA. CODE § 8.9-101, Official Comment. See also note 230 infra & accompanying
text.
207. See note 328 infra & accompanying text. But see note 14 supra.
208. VA. CODE § 8.01-480, supra note 205.
209. Id.
210. See generally Murphy, Cotenancies: A Critique for Creditors, 48 VA. L. REv. 405
(1962).
211. Wallace v. Wallace, 168 Va. 216, 190 S.E. 293 (1937). Cf. VA. CODE §§ 55-20 to 21
(Repl. Vol. 1974) (by implication).
212. See King v. Merryman, 196 Va. 844, 86 S.E.2d 141 (1955); VA. CODE §§ 6-55.1, 20-
111, 55-20.
213. 204 Va. 123, 129 S.E.2d 661 (1963). Section 20-111 of the Virgnia Code, which extin-
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ceeds from a sale of real estate owned by the entireties likewise are
held by the entireties.21 4 As will be indicated below, the particular
type of cotenancy that owns the personal property determines
whether the property may be subjected to the claims of judgment
creditors.
In a tenancy in common, the cotenant is not considered to own
the whole estate but rather a definite fractional part of the
whole.215 Each cotenant may freely dispose of his interest in the
estate without permission from the others. There is no right of sur-
vivorship in such estates and, on the death of one tenant, his por-
tion passes to his heirs or legatees.2 16 From the creditor's view-
point, this type of cotenancy is the most advantageous because the
joint owner's interest is subject to levy both during his lifetime and
after his death.217 Personal property held by tenancy in common
should be available for execution and sale and the proceeds used to
pay the amount of judgment after the nonliable cotenants have
been reimbursed for their interests.218 This type of cotenancy is
preferred by statute in Virginia and the creditor always should be
prepared to argue that any jointly held property is held as a ten-
ancy in common in the absence of a written instrument expressly
showing a contrary intent.219 With the exception of automobiles or
mobile homes which require certificates of title, most types of per-
sbnalty are unaccompanied by an instrument indicating the nature
of the joint ownership.
Cotenants in a joint tenancy each own an undivided share of the
whole property When one cotenant dies, the right of survivorship
abolishes the decedent's interest, and the remaining cotenants con-
tinue to own the whole property 220 The individual interest of a
guishes contingent property rights upon the entry of a valid divorce decree, recognizes, by
implication, the right to own personalty as joint tenants or tenants by the entirety. See note
211 supra & accompanying text. See also Moore v. Glotzbach, 188 F Supp. 267 (E.D. Va.
1960).
214. 204 Va. at 126-27, 129 S.E.2d at 663.
215. Jenkins v. Jenkins, 211 Va. 797, 180 S.E.2d 516 (1971).
216. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.5 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
217. Murphy, supra note 210, at 409; see, e.g., VA. CODE § 55-20 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
218. See Murphy, supra note 210, at 408.
219. VA. CODE § 55-21 (Repl. Vol. 1974). See also Allen v. Parkey, 154 Va. 739, 149 S.E.
615 (1930).
220. Jenkins v. Jenkins, 211 Va. 797, 180 S.E.2d 516 (1971).
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joint tenant can be freely disposed of unilaterally The transfer of
an interest converts the estate into a tenancy in common as be-
tween the transferee and the remaining cotenants 2 ' The free
transferability of interest during the cotenants' lifetimes likewise
subjects the property to levy by creditors of the cotenants. The
Virginia Code expressly makes real estate owned by joint tenants
susceptible to partition for the benefit of lien creditors, 2  and by
analogy, personalty similarly held also should be available to sat-
isfy money judgments. The creditor must proceed against the
property during the debtor's lifetime because his interest termi-
nates at death. The creation of a joint tenancy has been made
more difficult by a statute in Virginia that abolishes the right of
survivorship except when the instrument creating the joint estate
expressly indicates that survivorship is intended.223 In the absence
of an expression of intent, the property is subject to debts as if it
were held as a tenancy in common.224
Tenancy by the entirety may exist only between husband and
wife, and each spouse is considered to own the entire estate con-
currently with the other. Upon the death of one, the estate remains
in the survivor, and the dying spouse's interest is extinguished.225
Neither spouse may transfer or dispose of his interest in the estate
without the other joining in the conveyance. 226 Because the estate
is nonseverable, a creditor of one spouse cannot levy on property
held by the entirety 227 The creditor, however, is not completely
without hope. The Virginia Code converts tenancies by the en-
tirety into tenancies in common except when the instrument creat-
ing the estate expressly indicates an entirety is intended. ss If the
type of joint estate is ambiguous, the creditor should be able to
challenge successfully any contention that the debtor intended to
hold the property by the entirety Also, a judgment against both
221. Leonard v. Boswell, 197 Va. 713, 721, 90 S.E.2d 872, 877 (1956).
222. VA. CODE § 8.01-81 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
223. Id. § 55-21 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
224. Id. § 55-20.
225. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.6 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952). See discussion in Vasilion
v. Vasiion, 192 Va. 735, 66 S.E.2d 599 (1951). See also Grilliot & Yocum, Tenants by the
Entirety: An Ancient Fiction Frustrates Modern Creditors, 17 AM. Bus. L. J. 341 (1979).
226. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.6 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
227. Id.
228. VA. CODE § 55-21 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
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the husband and the wife can be enforced by a levy on the prop-
erty owned by the entireties because they are jointly and severally
liable for the debt.229 A valid divorce decree, however, has the ef-
fect of converting property owned as joint tenants or tenants by
the entirety into tenancies in common.2 80
United States savings bonds warrant individual attention. In
Guldager v. United States,2"' the Sixth Circuit addressed whether
Series "E" Government bonds registered in coownership form to a
husband "or" his wife created an estate by the entireties under
state law, thereby precluding levy for the individual debts of the
husband. The court contended that the estate created by the
bonds was not an estate that arose under state law, but rather one
created by federal contract and therefore subject to federal law.282
The appropriate statutory authorization for the bonds provides
that they are subject to the terms and conditions embodied in the
Treasury Department regulations, which, under the court's hold-
ing, become part of the contract. Because the estate is created by
an instrument that recognizes the rights of creditors in the severa-
ble interests of the coowner, the husband's creditors could subject
that interest to execution.233
Current federal regulations provide that bonds issued in coown-
ership form ("husband or wife") create a right of survivorship in
the coowner. 3 4 The regulations specifically recognize that bonds
229. In re Bishop, 482 F.2d 381 (4th Cir. 1973) (creditor of one spouse may not obtain
lien against property or interest of spouse in entirety property); Reid v. Richardson, 304
F.2d 351, 355 (4th Cir. 1962) (entirety property may be sold to satisfy claims of all parties
holding joint obligations); In re Reid, 198 F Supp. 689-691 (W.D. Va. 1961) (only joint
creditors can participate in entirety property); Vasilion v. Vasilion, 192 Va. 735, 66 S.E.2d
599 (1951) (creditor of wife cannot sell entirety property by resort to attachment or levy).
230. VA. CODE § 20-111 (Repl. Vol. 1975).
231. 204 F.2d 487 (6th Cir. 1953).
232. Id. at 489.
233. Id. See also Simon v. Schaetzel, 189 F.2d 597 (10th Cir. 1951). Contra, In re
Smulyan, 98 F Supp. 618 (M.D. Pa. 1951); Alcorn v. Alcorn, 364 Pa. 375, 72 A.2d 96 (1950).
234. 31 C.F.R. § 315.7(a)(2) (1977); id. § 315.62 provides in part that
[i]f either coowner dies without the bond having been presented and surren-
dered for payment or authorized reissue, the survivor will be recognized as the
sole and absolute owner. Thereafter, payment or reissue will be made as
though the bond were registered in the name of the survivor alone.
Id. Id. § 315.60 of the regulations authorizes either coowner to cash the bond. Section
315.61(a)(1) provides that upon divorce, legal separation, or annulment, the bond may be
reissued in the name of either coowner alone or with another person as the new coowner of
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registered in coownership may be subjected to levy to satisfy a
judgment against only one of the coowners2 5 Under such circum-
stances, however, the creditor is limited to the coowner's interest
in the bond.23 The regulations state that the interest may be es-
tablished by an agreement between coowners, or by the judgment
decree, or order of a court, provided both coowners are parties to
the proceeding.23 7 What form an "agreement" between the parties
would have to take is uncertain, but there is no requirement of a
writing or recordation. If, as the court in Guldager held, the regu-
lations and not state law govern the contract, then to foresee the
problems that inevitably will arise over establishing exactly what a
coowner's interest is in the property is not difficult. The court in
Guldager noted that the bonds in question had been purchased
exclusively with the husband's funds, but it did not address the
question of the interests of the respective spouses because an es-
crow agreement that existed between the parties to the suit al-
ready had resolved that issue.2 8
Property Fraudulently Conveyed
A judgment creditor may use the execution process to reach
property fraudulently conveyed by the debtor.2 39 The conveyance
beneficiary.
235. 31 C.F.R. § 315.21(a) (1978) provides:
Payment (but not reissue) of a savings bond registered in single ownership,
coownership, or beneficiary form will be made to the purchaser at a sale under
levy or to the officer authorized to levy upon the property of registered owner
or coowner under appropriate process to satisfy a money judgment. Payment
will be made to such purchaser or officer only to the extent necessary to satisfy
the judgment and will be limited to redemption value current sixty days after
the termination of the judicial proceedings. Payment of a bond registered in
coownership form pursuant to a judgment or levy against only one of the
coowners will be limited to the extent of that coowner's interest in the bond.
This interest may be established by an agreement between coowner or by a
judgment decree or order of court entered in a proceeding to which both
coowners are parties.
Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. 204 F.2d at 488.
239. Matney v. Combs, 171 Va. 244, 198 S.E. 469 (1938); see Rixey v. Dietrick, 85 Va. 42
(1888); Waller v. Johnson, 82 Va. 966 (1887); Saunders v. Waggoner, 82 Va. 316 (1886);
Wray v. Davenport, 79 Va. 19 (1884); Lucas v. Claflin, 76 Va. 269 (1882); VA. CODE §§ 55-80
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is considered void as to existing creditors and antecedent
debtors. 40
Property in Custodia Legis
Property in the custody of the law is not subject to execution.
This is true of property in the hands of receivers. 4' When a re-
ceiver has been appointed but not yet qualified, however, property
of the debtor may be levied on until the creditor's rights are pre-
empted by qualification. The prohibition extends to money in the
hands of a sheriff that represents the proceeds of an execution sale
and personalty in the possession of administrators, executors, and
guardians. The policy underlying the concept of legal custody is to
prevent conflicts between courts of different jurisdictions and
thereby encourage orderly administration of justice in the individ-
ual courts.242
SATISFACTION OF THE JUDGMENT
Sale of Tangible Personalty
In Virginia, the sheriff is empowered by statute to sell personalty
to satisfy the fien facias.243 The officer conducting the sale must
post notice of the time and whereabouts of the sale at least ten
days before it transpires. 244 Under certain circumstances, the goods
may be sold earlier, as when the personalty is perishable or the
cost of storage is excessive.2 45 The goods only can be sold to the
highest bidder at the sale and only as much property as may be
necessary to satisfy the judgment may be sold.246 If the proceeds of
the sale exceed the amount needed to satisfy the fieri facias, then
to 82 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
240. Id. See generally G. GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES (rev. ed.
1940); Ulrich, Fraudulent Conveyances and Preferences in Virginia, 36 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 51 (1979).
241. Frayser's Adm'r v. Richmond & A. R. R., 81 Va. 388 (1886).
242. See generally FREEMAN ON EXECUTIONS, supra note 21, §§ 129-35.
243. VA. CODE § 8.01-492 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
244. Id. Notice must be posted near the residence of the owner of the goods if he lives in
the locale where the sale is to take place. The sheriff also must post notice of the sale in two
or more public places in the city or county. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
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the balance must be returned to the debtor.247 Also, if the debtor
obtains an injunction or supersedeas to an execution after the sale
but before the proceeds are paid over to the creditor, then the
money must be given to the debtor.2""
If the purchaser at an execution sale fails to comply with the
terms of the sale, the sheriff may hold another sale either immedi-
ately or after properly advertising.29 If the proceeds from the sec-
ond sale are less than the first, the original purchaser is liable for
the difference.250
Neither the sheriff nor the employees of any city or county, re-
gardless of the sales location, may bid on goods sold under a writ
of execution.25 l Proceeds from the sale must be turned over forth-
with by the sheriff to the court or the clerk's office where the judg-
ment is entered, or the creditor may hold the sheriff liable.252 The
sheriff may deduct from the amount of the sale a commission equal
to five percent of the sale price of the goods plus expenses and
costs. 253 The sheriff also must notify in writing the person entitled
to receive the money from the sale within thirty days or be liable
for a fine of between twenty and fifty dollars. 25 If the person to
whom the sale money is owed lives outside the county or city
where the sale is held, then the sheriff need not go beyond his ju-
risdiction to make payment.2 5 The creditor must demand payment
in the county or city in which the officer is located.258 When the
return on the writ of execution indicates that the property levied
on has not been sold, the creditor may have a writ of venditont
exponas issued which directs the sheriff to sell the property in the
manner discussed.257
247. Id. § 8.01-495. See also id. § 8.01-373.
248. Id. § 8.01-495.
249. Id. § 8.01-494.
250. Id.
251. Id. § 8.01-498.
252. Id. § 8.01-499. This changes the old rule under former § 8-429 which required the
officer to return the money within 30 days.
253. Id. § 8.01-499.
254. Id. § 8.01-500.
255. Id. § 8.01-496.
256. Id.
257. Id. § 8.01-485. The writ also issues when an earlier sale was held but either there
were no bidders or no bid received was satisfactory, in which case the advertisement for the
sale ordered by the writ must take notice of that fact. Id.
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A purchaser at an execution sale receives no implied warranty of
title as to the property he buys.2"" The old common law rule of
caveat emptor applies to these sales, meaning that the buyer ac-
quires no better title to the goods than the debtor had.25 9 A pur-
chaser is charged with knowledge of any errors that can be discov-
ered from the record, including whether the proper persons were
parties to the suit.26 0 This has the inevitable effect of diminishing
the value that can be realized from the sale, to the detriment of
the debtor. When the property is sold under an indemnifying
bond, however, and the purchaser later is forced to surrender the
property to someone with superior title, the buyer may sue under
the bond in the name of the officer for any damages he suffered as
a consequence.261
Interrogatory Procedure
Under Virginia law, a judgment creditor with a valid writ of fien
facias has a supplementary procedure available that allows him to
subject the debtor to examination about his personal estate. Under
this interrogatory system, the creditor may summon the debtor, as
well as any bailee or debtor of the debtor, before the court or an
appointed commissioner. 26 2 This procedure is summary in nature;
no trial by jury is available nor are pleadings required. The persons
summoned then may be questioned by the creditor or the court
concerning any personal estate of the debtor that may be used to
satisfy the judgment. 68 A recent addition to the interrogatory sys-
tem allows the creditor to require the production of books of ac-
counts or other writings that contain evidence of the debtor's es-
tate, provided that the creditor gives an affidavit stating that he
believes the books exist and identifies them with reasonable cer-
258. BURKS, PLEADING AND PRACTICE, supra note 41, at 698.
259. Id. Compare the UCC section governing sale of collateral by the secured party under
Article 9. VA. CODE § 8.9-504(4) & Official Comment 4.
260. Lamar v. Hale, 79 Va. 147 (1884).
261. VA. CODE § 8.01-370 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
262. Id. § 8.01-506 (Cum. Supp. 1978). General district courts have been given the same
power. Id. § 16.1-103 (Cum. Supp. 1979). The following persons may be summoned: the
debtor, any officer of the corporation if the debtor is a corporation that has an office in
Virginia, a debtor of the execution debtor or a bailee of the debtor. Id.
263. Id. § 8.01-506.
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tainty 264 Resort to this summary procedure against the debtor is
limited by statute to once in any six month period except when the
creditor can show good cause.26 5 The creditor must furnish the
court with a certificate to the effect that he has not interrogated
the debtor within the past six months whenever he seeks to employ
the procedure; if he knowingly asserts false information in the cer-
tificate, he is guilty of a misdemeanor."'
The language used in section 8.01-506 has not been amended to
comport with the changes under section 8.01-478 which make the
lien on tangibles effective only from the date of levy. Conse-
quently, the wording "to ascertain the personal estate on which a
writ of fleri facias is a lien '267 arguably can be interpreted to re-
strict the scope of the interrogatory inquiry on personalty only to
intangible property because no lien exists on tangibles until levy
has occurred. Although this result obviously was unintentional, be-
cause under the old system delivery of the writ to the sheriff cre-
ated a lien on all personalty, the debtor's counsel should argue that
it is the only logical interpretation of the statute in its current
form. This certainly creates problems as far as tangible personalty
is concerned and has the effect of encouraging the debtor to secrete
or otherwise dispose of such property to avoid subjecting it to lia-
bility on the judgment.
The interrogatory procedure is also one method for reaching in-
tangible property that is not subject to levy.268 When intangible
property is discovered, the court may compel the person in posses-
sion or in control of the property to deliver it to the officer holding
the unsatisfied fi.fa.269 The court also can order the party to assign
264. Id. § 8.01-506.1 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
265. Id. § 8.01-506(C).
266. Id.
267. Id. § 8.01-506(A) reads:
To ascertain the personal estate on which a writ of fien facias is a lien, and to
ascertain any real estate, m or out of this Commonwealth, to which the debtor
named in a judgment and fieri facias is entitled, upon the application of the
execution creditor, the clerk of court from which such fieri facias issued shall
issue a summons against the execution debtor, having an office in this Com-
monwealth, or any debtor to, or bailee of, the execution debtor.
Id. (emphasis supplied).
268. See note 55 supra & accompanying text.
269. VA. CODE § 8.01-507 (Repl. Vol. 1977) states in appropriate part as follows:
[A]ny money, bank notes, securities, evidences of debt, or other personal es-
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the property to the creditor in a manner specified in the order.2 70
Evidences of indebtedness owed by third persons to the debtor
likewise can be collected under the interrogatory procedure by di-
recting that payment be made to the sheriff for the benefit of the
creditor within sixty days after evidence of the debt has been de-
livered to the sheriff.2 71
The court or commissioner has the power to arrest and imprison
any person summoned under this procedure who fails to appear
and answer or otherwise refuses to cooperate. 2  The person so ar-
rested may be kept in custody until he complies. 272-1 The harshness
of these sanctions has resulted in a general reluctance on the part
of the courts to employ them.
FEDERAL COURT JUDGMENTS
Applicable federal law provides that money judgments issued by
federal district courts are enforceable in Virginia in the same man-
ner as judgments rendered by the state courts.2 73 A judgment of a
federal court sitting in Virginia creates a lien on the property of
the judgment debtor "to the same extent and under the same con-
ditions as a [state] court of general jurisdiction, and shall cease to
be a lien in the same manner and time. 2 74 Accordingly, the federal
judgment, under Virginia law, would not create a lien on person-
alty when docketed as it does on realty 27 The Federal Rules of
tate, tangible or intangible, which it may appear by such answers are in posses-
sion of or under the control of the debtor or his debtor or bailee, shall be deliv-
ered by him or them, as far as practicable, to such officer, or to some other, or
in such manner as may be ordered by the commissioner or court.
Id.
270. Id.
271. Id. § 8.01-510.
272. Id. § 8.01-508 (Cur. Supp. 1978). See Vail v. Quinlan, 406 F Supp. 951 (S.D.N.Y.
1976), rev'd on other grounds sub. nom. Judice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977) (New York
statute that allowed a judgment debtor to be imprisoned for failing to comply with a disclo-
sure subpoena concerning his ability to satisfy a judgment was held to violate due process;
the procedure under the statute permitted the debtor to be beld in contempt, fined and
imprisoned without a hearing).
272.1. Compare Drake v. National Bank of Commerce of Norfolk, 168 Va. 230, 190 S.E.
302 (1937).
273. 28 U.S.C. § 1962 (1970). See U.S. CONST. art. 4, § 1.
274. 28 U.S.C. § 1962 (1970).
275. See VA. CODE § 8.01-447 (Rep. Vol. 1977) provides that
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Civil Procedure provide in rule 69(a) that the process for enforcing
money judgments is by a writ of execution unless the court directs
otherwise . 78 The Rule requires that the execution procedure be
carried out in accordance with the practice and procedure of the
state in which the remedy is sought. 7 7 The writ of execution issu-
ing on the judgment is enforceable by a United States Marshal an-
ywhere in the State of Virginia .278 Therefore, any personal prop-
erty subject to levy under Virginia law may be levied on by the
marshal. 2 7 9 The lien on intangibles arises when the writ is deliv-
ered to the federal officer 280 and the lien on tangible personalty is
deferred until an actual levy is made on the property.281 Property
levied on by the federal marshal may be sold in accordance with
the Virginia procedures for execution sales.28 2
Rule 69(a) also provides that the judgment creditor may employ
the discovery procedures of federal courts or the state courts of
Virginia to discover the assets of the debtor.283 This option pro-
[j]udgments and decrees rendered in the circuit court of appeals or a district
court of the United States within this Commonwealth may be docketed and
indexed in the clerk's offices of courts of this Commonwealth in the same man-
ner and under the same rules and requirements of law as judgments and de-
crees of courts in this Commonwealth.
276. FED. R. Civ. P 69(a) states the following:
Process to enforce a judgment for the payment of money shall be a writ of
execution, unless the court directs otherwise. The procedure on execution, in
proceedings supplementary to and in aid of a judgment, and in proceedings on
and in aid of execution shall be in accordance with the practice and procedure
of the state in which the district court is held
Id.
277. Mission Bay Campland, Inc. v. Sumner Fin. Corp., 71 F.R.D. 432, 433 (M.D. Fla.
1976); Invor B. Clark Co. v. Hogan, 296 F Supp. 398, 402 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), modified on
other grounds, 296 F Supp. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); United States v. English Constr. Co., 95 F
Supp. 763, 764 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Schram v. Spivack, 68 F Supp. 451, 453 (E.D. Mich. 1946).
278. 7 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 69.03[2] (2d ed. 1979); see Edmonston v. Sisk, 156
F.2d 300 (10th Cir. 1946).
279. Hayes v. Schaefer, 399 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1968).
280. See note 55 supra & accompanying text. See also United States v. Pearson, 258 F
Supp. 686, 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
281. See note 56 supra & accompanying text.
282. It has been held that rule 69(a) precludes the use of federal procedures for judicial
sales in 28 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2002 (1970) in execution sales. See Weir v. United States, 339
F.2d 82 (8th Cir. 1964).
283. Rule 69 authorizes the use of all discovery devices that are available in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. United States v. McWhirter, 376 F.2d 102, 106 (5th Cir. 1967). See
also 7 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 69.0511] (2d ed. 1979); FED. R. Civ. P 69, NoTEs OF
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vides the creditor with a range of discovery devices unavailable
under state law, including the use of written interrogatories 284 and
depositions.285 Third parties, as well as the judgment debtor, may
be examined to discover hidden or concealed assets of the
debtor.26 Any person interrogated under this procedure can seek a
protective order from the court to prevent harassment or abuse.287
Also, rule 69 has been held to incorporate state law on arrest and
body execution into federal practice in aid of execution.8 8
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE AND EXECUTION
Adoption of the UCC in Virginia has had the effect of preempt-
ing prior law dealing with conditional sales and chattel mortgages,
and statutes otherwise regulating security interests in personal
property 289 A survey of the UCC and its effect on the personal
property of the debtor is beyond the scope of this Note;2 0 how-
ever, the article 9 section dealing with lien creditors is particularly
relevant to the focus of this study. Section 8.9-301(1) subordinates
an unperfected security interest to a person who becomes a lien
creditor before the security interest is perfected,29 1 except in the
case of a purchase money security interest, when the Code allows
the secured creditor a ten-day grace period in which to file.292 In
order for a lien creditor to qualify under this section, the lien must
be perfected according to applicable Virginia law This means that
in the case of tangibles, the goods in question actually must be
levied on.29 3 The revision of the Code in 1972 omitted the require-
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON 1970 AMENDMENTS TO RULES.
284. United States v. McWhirter, 376 F.2d 102, 106 (5th Cir. 1967).
285. Id.
286. Caisson Corp. v. County West Bldg. Corp., 62 F.R.D. 331 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
287. Id.
288. United Refrigerator Co. v. Gershel, 276 F.2d 573 (2d Cir. 1960).
289. VA. CODE § 8.9-102 (Curi. Supp. 1979).
290. See generally G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY (1965); S.
RiESENFELD, CREDITORS' REMEDIES, supra note 116, at 127-39; J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1972); Dugan, Creditors'
Postjudgment Remedies, Part 1, 25 ALA. L. REV. 175 (1972); Kripke & Felsenfeld, Secured
Transactions: A Practical Approach to Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 17
RUTGERS L. REV. 168 (1962).
291. VA. CODE § 8.9-301(1) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
292. Id. § 8.9-301(2).
293. See note 56 supra.
772 [Vol. 21:731
1980] MONEY JUDGMENTS AGAINST PERSONAL PROPERTY
ment that a lien creditor must be without knowledge of the un-
perfected security interest at the time the lien arises in order to
take priority over it. 29 4 Consequently, a lien creditor may levy on
goods in the hands of the debtor that the creditor knows are sub-
ject to an unperfected security interest without jeopardizing the
seniority of his claim to the property.2 5
The Code distinguishes between when a security interest "at-
taches" and when it is "perfected." When the security interest at-
taches, the secured party has an interest in the particular property
that is effective against the debtor. When the security interest is
perfected, the secured party has an interest in the property that is
good against third parties.2 8 Attachment occurs when the debtor
signs the security agreement, gives value, and has rights in the col-
lateral.297 Perfection of the security agreement may occur at the
same time or later but not before attachment.29 8 The method for
perfecting a security interest varies depending on the type of col-
lateral. In the case of tangible personalty, a financing statement
must be filed to perfect the security interest.2 9 Several exceptions
apply to this requirement. No filing is required to perfect when the
collateral remains in the possession of the secured party or when
there is a purchase money security interest in consumer goods.300 A
security interest in motor vehicles, though, can be perfected only
by proper notation on the certificate of title if the vehicle is used
for consumer purposes or as equipment.301 On the other hand,
294. See VA. CODE § 8.9-301 (1964) (amended 1973).
295. Id.
296. In re Certified Packaging, Inc., 8 UCC REP. SERV. 95, 99 (D. Utah 1970). See also
Wiseman & King, Perfection, Filing and Forms Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, 9 WAYNE L. REv. 580 (1963).
297. VA. CODE § 8.9-203 (Cure. Supp. 1979).
298. Id. § 8.9-203 (Added Vol. 1965).
299. Id. § 8.9-302(1) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
300. Id. §§ 8.9-302(1)(a), (d).
301. Id. §§ 8.9-302(3), (4); id. §§ 46.1-69 to 71 (Repl. Vol. 1974). This applies to
automobiles, trailers, semitrailers and mobile homes. In re McCroskey, 19 UCC REP. SERv.
1394, 1395 (W.D. Va. 1976) held that Virginia law clearly requires notation of a lien on the
certificate of title in order to perfect a lien on a mobile home. See also In re Smith, 311 F
Supp. 900 (W.D. Va. 1970), aff'd sub. nom. Callaghan v. Commercial Credit Corp., 437 F.2d
898 (4th Cir. 1971). A nonresident who fails to register his automobile in Virginia as re-
quired by state law, and therefore has no certificate of title indicating liens from a condi-
tional sale, may be subject to attachment because the liens are not recorded. C.I.T. Corp. v.
Crosby & Co., 175 Va. 16, 7 S.E.2d 107 (1940).
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when the vehicles are held as inventory for sale, the security inter-
est must be perfected by filing.30 2
Virginia has adopted the dual filing requirement alternative
under the UCC which, with certain exceptions,303 provides that the
financing statement be filed with both the State Corporation Com-
mission and the clerk of the circuit court where the debtor does
business, if there is only one place of business, or where the debtor
resides, if he has no place of business.304 If the personalty is con-
sumer goods, however, the security interest must be filed in the
county or city where the debtor resides or, if he lives outside Vir-
gmia, the locale of the goods.0 5 Improper filing is good against a
lien creditor only if the creditor has knowledge of the contents of
the financial statement that was filed erroneously 306 If the lien
creditor has no such knowledge, his lien subordinates the security
interest to his claim in the goods.301
The distinction between attachment and perfection is especially
important in cases dealing with purchase money security inter-
ests.308 As mentioned, the Code carves out a ten-day grace period
in which to perfect the security interest.30 9 The judgment creditor
302. VA. CODE § 8.9-302(3)(b) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
303. When the collateral is related to farming, then filing must be made in the county or
city of the debtor's residence, except when he is a nonresident of the state, in which case
filing is required in the county or city in which the goods are located. Id. § 8.9-401(1)(a). If
the collateral is in timber, minerals, or fixtures, then the filing is required whenever a mort-
gage on the real estate would be filed. Id. § 8.9-401(1)(b).
304. Id. § 8.9-401(1)(c).
305. Id. § 8.9-401(1)(a).
306. Id. § 8.9-401(2). See In Re County Green Ltd. Partnership, 438 F Supp. 693, 697
(W.D. Va. 1977).
307. 438 F Supp. at 696-97.
308. VA. CODE § 8.9-107 (Added Vol. 1965) defines a purchase money security interest as
a security interest that is
(a) taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all or part of its
price; or
(b) taken by a person who by making advances or incurring an obligation
gives value to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of collateral if
such value is in fact so used.
Id.
309. Id. § 8.9-301(2) reads as follows:
If the secured party files with respect to a purchase money security interest
before or within ten days after the debtor receives possession of the collateral,
he takes priority over the rights of a transferee in bulk or of a lien creditor
which arise between the time the security interest attaches and the time of
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should be aware that the grace period begins not when the security
interest attaches, but rather when the debtor receives actual physi-
cal possession. 10 Because attachment and possession can occur at
different times, a security interest filed later than ten days after it
attaches possibly would have priority over the claim of a lien credi-
tor whose lien arose between attachment and levy 31'I In the case of
a purchase money security interest in consumer goods, no filing is
required to perfect the security interest; perfection can occur no
later than the time of possession and the ten-day grace period
therefore is irrelevant.3 1
2
The rights of a lien creditor in secured collateral recently was
examined by the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Virginia in In re Mathews Dominion National Bank of
Richmond v. Starr ss The case involved a debtor who had pledged
certain shares of stock as collateral for a loan from the bank. The
bank's security interest in the shares was perfected properly under
Virginia law because the bank, as the secured party, was in posses-
sion of the stock.314 Later, the stock split and the debtor was is-
sued additional shares equal to the number possessed by the
bank." 5 When the bank learned of the existence of the new stock
from the debtor's trustee in bankruptcy, it sued for recovery alleg-
ing a possessory security interest in the shares.3 16 Because the trus-
tee in bankruptcy assumes the status of a lien creditor on the date
the petition is filed,3 17 the claim to the shares is determined by
whether the bank's security interest was perfected prior to the date
filing.
Id. (emphasis supplied).
310. Id. The Fourth Circuit has held that when the collateral is in several pieces, then the
purchaser receives "possession" only when he receives the last piece. In re Automated Book-
binding Servs., Inc., 471 F.2d 546, 553 (4th Cir. 1972). See also Brodie Hotel Supply, Inc. v.
United States, 431 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1970).
311. Henson, Some Thoughts on Lien Creditors Under Article 9, 1974 U. ILL. L.F 237,
244-45.
312. VA. CODE § 8.9-302(1)(d) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
313. 475 F Supp. 37 (E.D. Va. 1978).
314. Id.
315. Id. at 38.
316. Id.
317. VA. CODE § 8.9-301(3) (Cum. Supp. 1979) defines a lien creditor as "a creditor who
has acquired a lien on the property involved by attachment, levy or the like and includes
a trustee in bankruptcy from the date of filing of the petition " Id.
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of filing. Under the UCC, the only way a security interest in shares
of stock can be. perfected is by taking actual physical possession of
the security 18 Because the bank did not have possession, it had
only an unperfected security interest. The court therefore con-
cluded that the trustee, as lien creditor, had a claim to the prop-
erty that was superior to the unperfected security interest of the
bank.3 1 9
Lien creditors seeking property owned by the debtor that is sub-
ject to a valid security interest should ascertain whether the secur-
ity interest has been perfected properly. In Virginia, the filing re-
quirements are fairly complicated and susceptible to error. For
example, it has been held that a financing statement cannot add
collateral that is not described in the security agreement.320 Like-
wise, when dual filing is mandatory, a security interest filed in the
wrong place is meffective to perfect the security against claims of a
lien creditor.3 21 The financing statement also must be sufficiently
descriptive of the collateral secured or it is subject to challenge.3 22
A financing statement that omits the name and address of either
the debtor or the secured party may be defective. 23 Close scrutiny
of the financing statements may reveal defects that permit the lien
creditor to subordinate the security interest to the amount of his
lien.3 24 The adoption of the UCC in every state, except Louisiana,
has generated a wide range of case law in this area that is available
318. 25 UCC REP. SERV. at 308. See VA. CODE § 9-304(1) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
319. 25 UCC REP. SERV. at 308.
320. In re Mann, 318 F Supp. 32, 36 (W.D. Va. 1970).
321. In re Hurt Enterprises, Inc., 321 F Supp. 1307, 1309-10 (W.D. Va. 1971).
322. In re Mann, 318 F Supp. at 36. A financing statement that itself does not disclose
the terms of the security agreement cannot also serve as a security agreement. Id. at 35. But
see In re Varney Wood Prods., Inc., 458 F.2d 435 (4th Cir. 1972) that has held that a financ-
ing statement need only be sufficiently descriptive so as to reasonably generate further in-
quiry. Id. at 437.
323. See In re Gibson's Discount Pharmacy, Inc., 15 UCC REP. SERV. 233 (E.D. Tenn.
1974).
324. The Virginia Comment following VA. CODE § 8.9-402 states that
[a] failure to comply with any of the formal requisites set forth in the Virginia
statutes means that the instrument has not been validly recorded, docketed or
filed so it fails to accomplish the purpose of recordation - perfecting a security
interest. Virginia has adopted a rule of strict compliance with formal requisites
for recordation, so that recorded instruments have frequently failed of their
purpose. See In re Adkins, 197 F Supp. 287, 288 (E.D. Va. 1961).
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as a basis for challenging article 9 security agreements. 25
Finally, a perfected security interest has the effect of vesting cer-
tain rights and remedies in the secured party against the debtor in
the event of default. The security interest, however, does not bar a
subsequent judgment creditor from enforcing his rights by levying
on the property that is subject to the security interest. Section 8.9-
311 allows the judgment creditor to subject the debtor's rights in
collateral to levy even if the security agreement prohibits any
transfer or makes the transfer a default . 26 The creditor's rights
run only against the debtor's equity in the collateral and the se-
cured party is entitled to priority as to the proceeds of any sale. 27
This section is consistent with the non-UCC section of the Virginia
Code discussed earlier that permits a levying creditor to reach
goods subject to a prior lien.3 28 Consequently, a purchaser at an
execution sale takes the goods free of the security interest if the
levy constitutes default on the agreement, or subject to the secur-
ity agreement if the agreement remains in effect.32 9
EFFECT OF THE NEW BANKRUPTCY CODE
The new Bankruptcy Code enacted in the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978330 constitutes a major revision of existing bankruptcy
325. See, e.g., Walker, The Collection of Debts from Insolvent and Fully-Mortgaged
Debtors, 43 TENN. L. RE V. 399 (1976).
326. VA. CODE § 8.9-311 (Added Vol. 1965) provides that
[t]he debtor's rights in collateral may be voluntarily or involuntarily trans-
ferred (by way of sale, creation of a security interest, attachment, levy, garnish-
ment, or other judicial process) notwithstanding a provision in the security
agreement prohibiting any transfer or making the transfer constitute a default.
Id. For a discussion of the particular jurisdictional problems that are created when a credi-
tor seeks to levy on pledged securities see Kennedy, Rights of Levying Creditors, supra note
191, at 1527.
327. See Shaw Mudge & Co. v. Sher-Mart Mfg. Co., 16 UCC REi. Smv. 847, 851-52 (N.J.
Super. 1975). See also Citizens Bank v. Perrin & Sons, Inc., 253 Ark. 639, 488 S.W.2d 14
(1972) (in all security interests the debtor's interest in collateral subject to claims of credi-
tors); Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Pathological and Diagnostic Laboratories, Inc., 11 UCC RsP.
SERv. 386, 386-87 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1972) (secured creditors cannot make motion to vacate
execution sale of secured collateral brought about by valid levy); Maryland Nat'l Bank v.
Porter-Way Harvester Mfg. Co., 11 UCC REP. SaRv. 843 (Del. 1972) (secured creditor is
entitled to priority of the proceeds from execution sale of collateral).
328. See note 205 supra & accompanying text.
329. See notes 206-07 supra & accompanying text.
330. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 101 to 1501 (West. Supp. 1979). The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
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laws. The substantive provisions of the new legislation will apply
to all bankruptcy proceedings that commence on or after October
1, 1979.1s Section 547 of the 1978 Code,32 which deals with prefer-
ences, is of primary concern to a lien creditor of the bankrupt. The
law of preferences aims at promoting an equitable distribution of
the bankrupt's estate by prohibiting preferential treatment of
some creditors at the expense of others.333 Under the new law, the
trustee in bankruptcy may avoid any transfer of the property of
the bankrupt that was obtained 1) within ninety days of the filing
of bankruptcy, 2) while the debtor was insolvent, and 3) that en-
ables the creditor to receive more than such creditor would receive
had the transfer not been made.3 34 A transfer, as defined under the
1978 Code, includes a judicial lien obtained by levy.33 5
The period before the institution of bankruptcy proceedings
within which the trustee may avoid the lien has been shortened
from four monthss3 6 to ninety days. 37 This change benefits the
judgment creditor by granting him an extra month to levy on the
debtor's property There are several new pitfalls that did not exist
under the old Act, however, that create additional problems for the
has four titles: Title I is codified under Title 11 of the United States Code and is the section
dealing with the substantive law of bankruptcy that is of concern here; Title II amends Title
28 of the United States Code and establishes a new bankruptcy court and defines its juris-
diction; Title I amends certain nonbankruptcy statutes that apply to bankruptcy cases;
Title IV is the provision for the transitory period between the old and new acts.
331. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, tit. IV § 402(a) (1978).
332. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547 (West Supp. 1979).
333. J. MACLACHLAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BANKRuPTcy 283 (1956).
334. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(b) (West Supp. 1979). These requirements are virtually the same
as under the old law.
335. Id. § 101(40) defines a transfer as "every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or condi-
tional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest
in property, including retention of title as a security interest." A judicial lien is defined as a
"lien obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or pro-
ceedings." Id. § 101(27).
336. Bankruptcy Act of 1898 § 60(a)(1), 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1970) (repealed 1978).
337. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(b)(4)(A) (West Supp. 1979). When the transfer is made to an "in-
sider," the trustee may void any such transaction that takes place within one year before
bankruptcy. Id. § 547(b)(4)(B). An "insider" is defined under the new Act in different
terms, depending on whether the transferee is an individual, a corporation, partnership, mu-
nicipality or agent of the debtor. A common characteristic of all is a close, intimate relation-
ship with the bankrupt. Id. § 101(25). Preferential transfers are subject to attack between 90
days and one year of filing only when a showing can be made that the "insider" had "rea-
sonable cause to believe the debtor was insolvent." Id. § 547(b)(4)(ii).
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creditor's attorney The trustee no longer has the burden of prov-
ing that the bankrupt was insolvent at the time of transfer because
the new law establishes a presumption of insolvency for the ninety
days prior to the filing of the petition.338 Furthermore, the trustee
is not required to prove that the creditor had reasonable cause to
believe the debtor was insolvent at the time of transfer;3 9 the
knowledge of the creditor is irrelevant under the 1978 Code. Fi-
nally, the new legislation appears to have deemphasized, if not
erased, the "class of creditor" distinction that caused so much con-
fusion under the 1898 Act.3 40 Previously, a preferential transfer
was one that would allow the preferred creditor "to obtain a
greater percentage of his debt than some other creditor of the same
class." 41 The new language omits any reference to the class of
creditors; instead, a preferential transfer is one that would enable
"such creditor to receive more than such creditor would receive if
. the transfer had not been made. 34 2 "Such creditor" conceiva-
bly could be interpreted to mean "creditor of such class," but the
omission of any reference to a class in the language, coupled with
the confusion created by the wording under the old law, suggest
that the oversight was intentional.
In determining whether the transfer is voidable by the trustee in
bankruptcy, several factors are important. First, a transfer of per-
sonal property is perfected under the 1978 Code when a creditor
on a simple contract cannot acquire a judicial lien that is superior
to the interest of the transferee.' For personalty, this is the point
in time at which the execution lien becomes perfected under state
338. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(f) (West Supp. 1979). Compare FED. R. Evi. 301 (current burden
of proof) with Aulick v. Largent, 295 F.2d 41 (4th Cir. 1961)(burden of proof under the old
law).
339. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898 § 60(b), 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1970) (repealed 1978). Note,
however, that this rule is inapplicable under the 1978 Code when the transferee is an in-
Sider. See note 337 supra.
340. See generally V COUNTRYMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON DEBTOR AND CREDITOR 450-
51 2d ed. 1974); D. EPSTEIN, DEBTOR-CREDITOR RELATIONS IN A NUTSHELL 217-20 (1973).
Certain classes, of course, still seem to exist, such as secured creditors whose security is not
subject to avoidance by the trustee, 11 U.S.C.A. § 724(b)(1) (West Supp. 1979), and wage
claimants who have not been paid for wages earned within 90 days of bankruptcy. Id. §
507(a)(3).
341. Bankruptcy Act of 1898 § 60(a)(1), 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1970) (repealed 1978).
342. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(b)(5)(B) (West Supp. 1979).
343. Id. § 547(e)(1)(B).
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law. In Virginia, the distinction between tangible and intangible
personal property once again is underscored. The lien is estab-
lished on tangible personal property when the sheriff levies on the
goods or chattels,3 " whereas for intangibles, the lien arises when
the writ is delivered to the sheriff.3 45 For example, consider a writ
of execution issued against a debtor who owns a car that is fully
paid for and who is in possession of a promissory note from a third
person. The writ is delivered to the sheriff ninety-one days before
a petition in bankruptcy is filed. The sheriff is unable to levy on
the automobile or deliver the garnishment summons to the obligor
on the note for several days. The debtor's trustee in bankruptcy
may set aside the lien on the car but not the garnishment on the
third party because the lien on the latter arose outside the time
limit established under the new law.3 46 If, on the other hand, a levy
had been made on the automobile more than ninety days before
the petition was filed, the trustee could not have set aside the
transfer as a preference even though the execution sale did not
take place until less than ninety days prior to bankruptcy.
Although at first blush the judgment creditor who levies within
the ninety-day period before filing may feel that any further effort
to enforce the lien would be futile, it is important to bear in mind
that preferences are not void but merely voidable. The 1978 Code,
like the old law, does not automatically invalidate liens that arise
within the specified period. Instead, either the trustee or the
debtor must act affirmatively to set aside the lien.147 Admittedly,
their task is facilitated by the new law, but the outcome is not
necessarily a fat accompli to the creditor.
The 1978 Code adds an additional weapon to the debtor's arse-
nal. In the case of an involuntary transfer of property, it allows the
debtor to assume the avoidance powers of the trustee when the
trustee fails to exercise them, if the debtor could have exempted
such property had it not been transferred.3 48 The debtor may re-
cover the property from subsequent transferees as well as from the
344. See note 56 supra & accompanying text.
345. See note 55 supra & accompanying text.
346. See note 158 supra & accompanying text.
347. See, e.g., Fisher v. Pauline Oil & Gas Co., 309 U.S. 294 (1940). See also, CLE, EN-
FORCEMENT OF LIENS, supra note 61, at 288-92.
348. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 522(g), (h) (West Supp. 1979).
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initial transferee. 4 9 The debtor then is permitted to exempt the
recovered property to the extent that he otherwise could have ex-
empted the property.3 50 In order to exercise this avoidance power,
however, the debtor must intervene in any cause of action initiated
by the trustee.3 51 If he fails to do so, he may not sue later to avoid
the transfer.3 52
The new Bankruptcy Code also strengthens the automatic stay
provisions activated by the filing of a petition in bankruptcy.
Under the 1898 Act, filing automatically stayed all lien enforce-
ment against the property of the bankrupt, including liens created
by levy, that arose within four months of bankruptcy. 53 The 1978
Code makes no such distinction. Instead, the filing of a petition
automatically stays a number of enforcement procedures relevant
to the execution creditor: 1) any enforcement of a judgment ob-
tained before the commencement of the case;3 54 2) any act to cre-
ate, perfect, or enforce any lien against the property of the es-
tate;3 55 3) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against
property of the debtor that secured a prebankruptcy petition. 56
The judgment creditor must affirmatively request relief from the
automatic stay provisions from the bankruptcy court, at which
time the court, after notice and hearing, may annul, modify, or
condition the, stay for cause. 57 The stay will terminate automati-
cally as to the party requesting relief, if the court does not order
the stay continued within thirty days.3 58 The 1978 Code also pro-
vides that time periods, such as statutes of limitation, that affect
actions that are stayed, are tolled during the period that the stay is
in effect.3 5 9
349. Id. § 522(i). See S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 75, reprinted in [1978] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5787, 5863.
350. Id. Section 522(i) states that the debtor may exempt property under § 522(h) only to
the extent that he has exempted less property than allowed under § 522(b).
351. See S. REP. No. 989, supra note 349, at 5863.
352. Id.
353. Bankruptcy Act of 1898 § 67(a)(1), 11 U.S.C. § 107 (1970) (repealed 1978).
354. 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(a)(2) (West Supp. 1979).
355. Id. § 362(a)(4).
356. Id. § 362(a)(5).
357. Id. § 362(d).
358. Id. § 362(e).
359. Id. § 108(c).
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The net effect of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 is to facilitate the
twofold purpose of bankruptcy law, debtor relief and equal treat-
ment of creditors, by removing many of the impediments that have
resulted from the seemingly endless amendments and court inter-
pretations of an old law ill-suited to the modern-day economy To
the extent that the new Code is successful, the judgment creditor's
position vis-a-vis other creditors must suffer accordingly
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
Background
As mentioned at the beginning of this Note, the postjudgment
procedures available to the creditor have been part of Virginia law
since the colonial period.360 Yet only recently have a few scattered
courts 61 and an ever-increasing group of commentators6 2 begun to
consider the question of the constitutionality of these statutes. The
catalyst for the recent focus on postjudgment procedures derives
from the Supreme Court decisions in Snmadach v. Family Finance
Corp.,65 Fuentes v. Shevrn,3 6 4 Mitchell v. W.T Grant Co.,36 5 and
North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.Sa' Although these
decisions deal with prejudgment remedies available to creditors,
they have the effect of imposing minimum due process protections
360. See generally Riesenfeld, Collection of Money Judgments, supra note 1; Riesenfeld,
Enforcement of Money Judgments, supra note 1.
361. See notes 390, 397 infra & accompanying text. A majority of courts considering the
Issue of due process have held that notice and hearing is not required before executions.
Katz v. Ke Nam Kim, 379 F Supp. 65 (D. Hawaii 1974); Langford v. Tennessee, 356 F
Supp. 1163 (W.D. Tenn. 1973); Moya v. DeBaca, 286 F Supp. 606 (D.N.M. 1968), appeal
dismissed, 395 U.S. 825 (1969); Phillips v. Bartolomie, 46 Cal. App. 3d 346, 121 Cal. Rptr. 56
(1975); Raigoza v. Sperl, 34 Cal. App. 3d 560, 110 Cal. Rptr. 296 (1973); Wilson v. Grimes,
232 Ga. 388, 207 S.E.2d 5 (1974). One state court has held that notice and hearing is re-
quired. Luskey v. Steffron, Inc., 461 Pa. 305, 336 A.2d 298 (1925), aff'd on rehearing, 469 Pa.
377, 366 A.2d 223 (1976).
362. See, e.g., Alderman, Default Judgments and Postjudgment Remedies Meet the Con-
stitution: Effectuating Sniadach and Its Progeny, 65 GEo. L.J. 1 (1976); Dunham, Post-
Judgment Seizures: Does Due Process Require Notice and Hearing?, 21 S.D.L. REv. 78
(1976); Greenfield, A Constitutional Limitation on the Enforcement of Judgments - Due
Process and Exemptions, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 877.
363. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
364. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
365. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
366. 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
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on the enforcement stage of the collection process. Consequently,
the analogy to the postjudgment process has been inevitable, al-
though the Supreme Court as yet has been unwilling to address the
issue in any definitive manner.3 6 7
In 1924 the Supreme Court apparently rejected categorically due
process requirements in the postjudgment stage. In the case of En-
dicott Johnson v. Encyclopedia Press,68 the Court held that no-
tice to the debtor in the underlying action that resulted in the
judgment adequately alerted the debtor that further action by the
creditor might be necessary to enforce the judgment and, accord-
ingly, no further notice or hearing would be required before his
property could be reached.3 9 Twenty-two years later, in Griffin v.
Griffin,70 the Supreme Court delivered an opinion that appeared
at odds with the holding in Endicott Johnson, yet made no effort
to overrule or distinguish it. In Griffin, the Court held that a judg-
ment based on support arrearages could not be enforced by execu-
tion because the husband had not been given notice and hearing
before the judgment was docketed.71
Although the Supreme Court has refused to overrule Endicott
Johnson,3 7 2 a number of commentators have questioned its contin-
ued viability in light of Griffin and the due process requirements
wrought by Snmadach and its progeny.37 3 In Sniadach, the Court
struck down a Wisconsin statute that permitted a debtor's wages
to be garnished prior to judgment without providing an opportu-
nity for notice and hearing to challenge the garnishment. 4 Justice
Douglas, writing for the majority, held that the fourteenth amend-
367. The Supreme Court twice had the opportunity to consider cases relying on Endicott
Johnson v. Encyclopedia Press, mfra notes 372-75, dealing with postjudgment procedures,
but instead dismissed certiorari previously granted. See Moya v. DeBaca, 395 U.S. 825
(1969) (certiorari dismissed); Hanner v. DeMarcus, 390 U.S. 736 (1968) (certiorari dismissed
as improvidently granted).
368. 266 U.S. 285 (1924).
369. Id. at 288-89.
370. 327 U.S. 220 (1946).
371. Id. at 235.
372. 266 U.S. 285 (1924).
373. See note 325 supra. See also Countryman, The Bill of Rights and the Bill Collector,
15 Aaiz. L. RE V. 521, 545 (1973); Levy, Attachment, Garnishment and Garnishment Execu-
tion: Some American Problems Considered in Light of the English Experience, 5 CONN. L.
REv. 399, 434-38 (1973).
374. 395 U.S. at 342.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
ment requirement of procedural due process necessitated that the
debtor be given an opportunity to be heard before a prejudgment
garnishment of his wages.37 5
Three years later, in Fuentes, the Court struck down prejudg-
ment replevm statutes in Florida and Pennsylvania as unconstitu-
tionalY.6 The challenged statutes allowed the creditor to take out
an ex parte writ of seizure that authorized the sheriff to seize the
debtor's personalty before judgment.3 7 7 The procedure made no
provision for notice or hearing to the debtor to dispute the credi-
tor's claim. 78 The Court stated that any significant taking of prop-
erty was protected by the fourteenth amendment even if the depri-
vation were only temporary 379 Because the statutes failed to
provide for notice and an opportunity to be heard before the prop-
erty could be seized, the statutes were unconstitutional.380
Two years after Fuentes, the Court's decision in Mitchell81
seemingly retreated from the absolute requirement that notice and
hearing precede any prejudgment taking. Mitchell involved a chal-
lenge to the constitutionality of Louisiana's sequestration proce-
dure, which made no provision for notice and hearing before the
officer took possession of the merchandise.3 82 The majority opinion,
written by Justice White, employed a balancing of interest test to
sustain the Louisiana law. Unlike Smadach and Fuentes, both par-
ties had an interest in the specific property at issue, the creditor on
the basis of his vendor's lien and the debtor because of his right of
possession and title to the goods. 83 Consequently, when dual inter-
ests are involved, due process may be satisfied without a prior
hearing.38 4 The Louisiana procedure was found to contain sufficient
safeguards to meet constitutional standards. First, the writ of se-
questration could be issued only when the creditor provided a
375. Id.
376. 407 U.S. at 85-93.
377. Id. at 73-74.
378. Id.
379. Id. at 85, 90.
380. Id.
381. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
382. Id. at 601-08.
383. Id. at 604-06.
384. Id. at 608-10. See the analysis of this approach in Rendleman, Analyzing the
Debtor's Due Process Interest, 17 WM. & MARY L. REv. 35 (1975).
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sworn affidavit containing specific factual allegations. 85 Second,
authorization for the writ had to be granted by a judge rather than
a clerk of court.388 Third, facts relevant to obtaining the writ were
restricted to documentary proof of the creditor's lien and debtor's
default. This has the effect of minimizing the danger of mistaken
seizure that the adversary hearing sought to prevent in the earlier
cases.3 87 Fourth, the debtor was entitled to an immediate hearing
following seizure wherein the creditor had to justify the
sequestration.388
The last in the line of prejudgment cases was North Georgia
Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.,s 9 which involved a commercial
debtor whose bank account had been garnished at the beginning of
the suit brought by the creditor. No dual interest was involved be-
cause the creditor had no prior interest in the property sought, the
amount on deposit in the account. Accordingly, one would assume
that notice and hearing would be required. But the majority opin-
ion, written by Justice White, struck down the Georgia laws at is-
sue because they failed to satisfy the criteria in Mitchell: the affi-
davit upon which the garnishment was based had been provided by
an attorney with no firsthand knowledge of the facts, the writ was
authorized by a clerk of court, not a judge, and no provision was
made for an immediate hearing to test the validity of the
garnishment.390
Postjudgment Cases
The applicability of these cases to the postjudgment collection
process is uncertain. Two recent lower court decisions have
reached opposite conclusions. In Brown v. Liberty Loan Corp.,"9 1
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a district court holding
that Florida's garnishment statute was unconstitutional because it
authorized postjudgment garnishment of wages without providing
385. 416 U.S. at 616.
386. Id.
387. Id. at 618.
388. Id.
389. 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
390. Id. at 607.
391. 539 F.2d 1355 (5th Cir. 1976). The district court opinion can be found at 392 F.
Supp. 1023 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
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for notice and hearing on the issue of exemption.3 92 The court
noted that although the debtor had a substantial interest in notice
and a hearing, the state's interest in facilitating the enforcement of
judgments and the creditor's interest in satisfying his judgments
from the debtor's assets outweighed the debtor's interest. 93 In up-
holding the Florida statute, the court stated that a significant fac-
tor in its decision was that the debtor apparently had available the
opportunity for a prompt judicial hearing on his exemption
claim.39 4 Echoing Endicott Johnson, the Fifth Circuit also noted
that the proceedings leading to judgment provided the debtor with
notice that further action by the creditor would be necessary to
satisfy the judgment.9 5 Furthermore, the debtor had additional
protections in the restrictions on the amount of wages that could
be garnished as well as a federal law curbing discharge because of
garnishment.39 6
The opposite result was reached by the United States District
Court in Hawaii in Betts v. Tom,39 7 which struck down Hawaii's
postjudgment garnishment procedures.3 98 The court employed the
same balancing test used in Brown, but with a different result. In
evaluating the creditor's interest m collecting the judgment as
quickly and cheaply as possible and the state's interest in provid-
Ing an efficient collection system to encourage commercial transac-
tions, the court nevertheless concluded that debtor's need to pro-
vide for his family's welfare outweighed the other interests. 9 9 The
slight delay in execution in order to provide a notice and hearing
could not affect significantly the creditor's interest. The court con-
cluded that the statute therefore was unconstitutional in its pre-
sent form but suggested two acceptable alternatives: first, a proce-
dure that provided for preseizure notice and hearing; 00 second, a
procedure requiring an affidavit by the creditor stating why the
392. 539 F.2d at 1362.
393. Id. at 1363.
394. Id. at 1368.
395. Id.
396. Id.
397. 431 F Supp. 1369 (D. Hawaii 1977).
398. Id. at 1378..
399. Id. at 1376.
400. Id. at 1377.
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proceeds sought by the garnishment are not exempt, which then
would be evaluated by the judicial officer who issued the writ.40 1
These alternatives, coupled with an opportunity for a hearing on
the validity of the garnishment within a short period, would satisfy
constitutional requirements of due process. 402
There is a common thread of reasoning in what facially appear
to be two inconsistent holdings. Both courts concluded that Mitch-
ell provides the basic minimal constitutional requirements for
evaluating any given postjudgment system.403 Neither court, how-
ever, evaluated the statutes in terms of the single versus dual in-
terest dichotomy.404 In any judgment execution situation, by defi-
nition, no dual interest is involved that would justify applying the
Mitchell relaxed due process requirements. Consequently, the
stricter standard of notice and hearing should be available to the
defendant before his property is taken. Prior to judgment, a ques-
tion always exists whether the plaintiff will prevail on the merits to
establish the claim to goods he already has attached. After judg-
ment, however, his claim against the debtor is established and all
that remains is conversion of that claim into cash. Nevertheless,
constitutional problems persist in the postjudgment period during
which the debtor's property can be taken without notice or hear-
ing, because he may have available a number of defenses to execu-
tion that due process requires he have an opportunity to assert:
property exemptions, accord and satisfaction of the judgment, par-
401. Id. at 1377-78.
402. Id.
403. 539 F.2d at 1369; 431 F Supp. at 1377-78.
404. See Rendleman, supra note 384. Rendleman's interpretation of the Court's analyti-
cal mode requires an initial determination that a constitutionally protected property inter-
est is involved. Greenfield, supra note 362, at 898-906, considered this issue in the postjudg-
ment context of statutory exemptions and concluded that "the judgment debtor's interest in
his assets, as conferred by the exemption statutes, is 'property' within the meaning of the
fourteenth amendment." Id. at 906. This conclusion seems applicable to any situation in the
postjudgment period in which the judgment debtor stands to lose at a minmmum, present
enjoyment of the property that the creditor seeks to subject to execution. Likewise, the
Supreme Court has evidenced an inclination to interpret liberally the debtor's property in-
terest in the collection process. See Fuentes, 407 U.S. 67, 86. Once a determination is made
that a cognizable constitutional interest is involved, then the required procedure is depen-
dent on whether a dual or sole interest exists in the property. Rendleman does not address
the applicability of the analysis to the postjudgment period, but Greenfield suggests the
analogy is appropriate.
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tial payment of the debt, indigency, and invalidity of the judg-
ment. A system that denies the debtor access to a forum to raise
these issues is of questionable constitutionality
Until the Supreme Court directly addresses the postjudgment
process, the proper procedure will remain a matter of conjecture
leading inevitably to varying interpretations throughout the states.
It may be helpful, however, to analyze the Virginia statutes in
terms of both the strict Sniadach-Fuentes requirement of notice
and hearing as well as the less strigent test of Mitchell.
Virginia Postjudgment Execution Procedure
The law in Virginia dealing with postjudgment execution against
debtor's personalty does not require notice or hearing before issu-
ance of the writ of fi.fa., at the time of levy or even after levy 405 In
fact, under Virginia law a default judgment could be rendered, exe-
cution issued, personalty then levied on, seized, and sold without
the debtor's knowledge. The failure to require notice to the debtor
to perfect levy raises serious questions about the constitutionality
of the Virginia execution procedures.
The law does provide the debtor with an opportunity for a hear-
Ing to consider the validity of the writ if he takes affirmative ac-
tion. This is effectuated by a motion to quash the execution.40 6 The
motion results in an order by the court staying the proceedings on
the execution until completion of the hearing.407 This procedure,
however, likewise contains a flaw that raises constitutional ques-
tions in that the order staying execution of the writ does not be-
come effective until the debtor provides a bond that is satisfactory
405. Virginia statutes have no requirement that the officer levying the writ give notice to
the debtor. See, e.g., VA. CODE § 8.01-478, supra note 56. The Fourth Circuit has held that
although notice to the debtor is advisable, it is not mandatory. Palais v. DeJarnette, 145
F.2d 953 (4th Cir. 1944). See text accompanying notes 77-78 supra.
406. VA. CODE § 8.01-477 (Repl. Vol. 1977) provides in part that
[a] motion to quash an execution may, after reasonable notice to the adverse
party, be heard and decided by the court which issued the execution. Such
court, on the application of the plaintiff in the motion, may make an order
staying the proceedings on the execution until the motion be heard and deter-
mined, the order not to be effectual until bond be given in such penalty and
with such condition, and either with or without surety, as the court may
prescribe.
407. Id.
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to the court.408 Therefore, the hearing is available not as a matter
of right, but only when the debtor can afford to provide the bond.
More importantly, the ability of the debtor to take advantage of
this procedure presumes that he has notice of the levy in the first
place, which is not required by law. Although there is no time limi-
tation on making the motion,09 the practicalities of the situation
effectively impose one. For example, Virginia permits the debtor to
claim his homestead exemption at any time before the execution
sale.410 If he fails to do so, he waives his right to assert it later.
Because the debtor is not required to be notified of the levy, he
may lose his right to claim an exemption in the property seized if
it is sold without his knowledge; the debtor likewise loses his right
to use the goods in the period between levy and sale.411 Because
execution can issue on a writ at anytime within twenty years of the
judgment 41 2 without notice to the debtor prior to levy and, conse-
quently, without an effective opportunity to raise possible defenses
to execution at a hearing, the execution process under the Snia-
dach and Fuentes schemes does not appear to pass constitutional
muster.
The same result would obtain even under the more relaxed re:-
quirement of Mitchell. First, Virginia does not require the creditor
to provide a sworn affidavit when applying for the writ alleging
that the judgment has not been satisfied, the property sought is
not exempt, or other facts that would justify levy on the prop-
erty.413 Virginia procedure requires no more than a simple request
to the clerk of court for an execution.
Second, there is no requirement that a judicial officer authorize
or issue the writ of fien factas. Once the clerk of court issues the
writ, it is merely delivered to the sheriff for execution, who is con-
sidered to be acting on behalf of, and under the control of, the
408. Id.
409. Lowenbach v. Kelly, 111 Va. 439, 69 S.E. 352 (1910).
410. VA. CODE § 34-17 (Repl. Vol. 1976).
411. Likewise, the availability of the forthcoming bond as a means of maintaining use and
possession of the goods is also undercut where no notice is given. See note 176 supra &
accompanying text.
412. See note 42 supra & accompanying text.
413. See VA. CODE § 8.01-466, supra note 25.
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creditor from that moment on.414 Therefore, no government official
is responsible for determining that the execution is justified. The
sheriff may request an indemnifying bond if he has any question
concerning the validity of the seizure, but this is to protect him,
not the creditor, from liability Once the bond is provided, the of-
ficer must levy on the personalty specified by the creditor even if it
does not belong to the debtor.415 Third, that the creditor post bond
before execution is issued is not required. As mentioned earlier,
the sheriff may request an indemnifying bond, but this is not
mandatory Consequently, nothing deters the creditor from assum-
mng the risk of erroneous levy Because the debtor can waive his
homestead exemption by not filing it before the execution sale, the
creditor may be encouraged to levy on property he believes to be
exempt in the hope that the debtor will neglect to file in time.416
Finally, Virginia has no requirement for an immediate postseizure
hearing to determine the validity of the execution. Although the
debtor may have a hearing by making a motion to quash, that the
debtor does not have to be notified of the levy negates the effec-
tiveness of the hearing.417 The requirement that the debtor provide
a bond to utilize the motion to quash may discourage the debtor
from taking advantage of the proceeding.
The existing postjudgment enforcement system in Virginia may
have the effect of favoring the judgment-creditor to an extent that
raises serious constitutional questions. At the same time, a recent
study of changes made in prejudgment proceedings in response to
Snmadach and its progeny indicates that the due process require-
ments that have been imposed make very little difference and that
the beneficial effect upon the debtor is miniscule.418 In fact, the
study revealed that the debtor was in substantially the same posi-
tion as he was before the Supreme Court decisions. 419 Nevertheless,
the current Virginia system needs only certain minor modifications
to make it comport with constitutional standards set down in
414. Rowe v. Hardy, 97 Va. 674, 34 S.E. 625 (1899).
415. Wilson v. Butler, 17 Va. (3 Munf.) 559 (1813).
416. See Greenfield, supra note 362, at 921-22.
417. See note 373 supra.
418. Shuchman, Prejudgment Attachments in Three Courts of Two States, 27 BUFFALO
L. REv. 459, 486-87 (1978).
419. Id. at 487.
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Snmadach and Fuentes. First, the validity of the levy should de-
pend on effective notice to the debtor.420 The levy itself could be
perfected by the notice 421 or, if seizure is desired, then possession
could be taken after a specified interval following the notice of the
levy This time interval, for example, two weeks, would give the
debtor an opportunity to quash the execution by making the ap-
propriate motion to the court. The hearing on the motion to quash
should be available as a matter of right to all debtors and the re-
quirement that a bond be provided should be deleted. If the debtor
chooses not to exercise his right to a hearing, then the goods levied
on could be seized and sold in accordance with the present
procedures.
The one problem area involves personalty in the form of money
of the debtor. Levy by notice generally would have the effect of
denying the debtor his right to alienate the personalty levied on,
but would allow him to maintain possession and use; accordingly,
there is no "taking" in constitutional terms that requires protec-
tion.422 When funds of the debtor are involved, however, a restric-
tion on alienation has the effect of "taking" because the money has
no other use. In such circumstances, an immediate hearing should
follow notice of levy or garnishment, but no restriction should be
placed on the debtor's access to the money At the time of levy, the
debtor could be notified that the funds have been levied on and
that he will have to justify any expenditures on the basis that they
were necessary and essential to his support and maintenance. Al-
ternately, when the debtor's money is sought, notice and hearing
could be required before levy.423
These changes should provide the necessary constitutional safe-
guards to allow Virginia law to satisfy the due process require-
ments of the fourteenth amendment without seriously upsetting
the procedures as they exist currently The creditor's interest in
420. See, e.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
421. See, e.g., Greenfield, supra note 362, at 923.
422. See, e.g., Black Watch Farms, Inc. v. Dick, 323 F Supp. 100 (D. Conn. 1971) (attach-
ments of real estate are not considered taking in constitutional terms).
423. See Brabliam, Smadach Through Di-Chem and Backwards: An Analysis of Vir-
ginia's Attachment and Detinue Statutes, 12 U. RicH. L. REv. 157 (1977), which concludes
that the Virginia prejudgment statutes are probably constitutionally sound since they were
modified to comport with the Sniadach line of cases.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
finding assets to satisfy the judgment are not jeopardized by these
changes, yet the debtor's rights in his property are protected with-
out increasing significantly the costs of collection. Likewise, by
making the system fair to all parties, the state interest in providing
a reasonable method of enforcing its judgments while encouraging
commercial transactions is advanced.
CONCLUSION
Virginia procedures for enforcing money judgments against per-
sonalty have remained relatively unchanged since the colonial days
even though the economy has undergone radical transformation.
Most of the case law in this area is from the previous century when
the execution was the primary mode of collection for the diligent
creditor. The virtual absence of any recent Virginia Supreme Court
decisions in this area suggests that, at least where personalty is of
a value sufficient to justify the cost of appeal, the UCC security
interest probably provides a more attractive alternative to the
creditor. Although the execution process generally involves little
expense to the creditor because it can be implemented without in-
terference from the court, it is unattractive to the creditor because
it depends on liquidating the property by means of a forced sale
that recovers only a small percentage of the value of the goods. A
writ of execution today is used primarily to force the debtor into
settlement of the debt or as a means to employ garnishment pro-
ceedings. Nevertheless, the execution process continues to be the
kingpin in understanding the postjudgment collection system as a
whole in Virginia, and for that reason alone, the practicing attor-
ney must master the many statutory procedures available.
RALPH G. SANTOS
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